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Abstract 
This thesis presents an investigation of what shapes the support for redistribution in OECD 
countries, in a rational choice perspective. Employing an understanding of the effect of 
economic inequality, first provided by Meltzer and Richard (1981) in “A Rational Theory of 
the Size of Government”, it is expected that there is a positive effect of rising economic 
inequality on the support for income redistribution. The notion of economic inequality as a 
predictor for the support of redistribution is somewhat reaffirmed in this thesis, as is rational 
choice as a relevant predictor in the formation of public opinion on an economic issue such as 
this. Other possible predictors based on the national setting and context receives less support. 
Pre- and post-transfer economic inequality-measures are tested as alternative predictors for the 
support of redistribution, but only the pre-transfer version of it demonstrates a significant effect.   
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1 Introduction 
What forms the support for redistribution in modern democracies? Historically, the 
establishment of the modern welfare state can be framed as a response to the level of economic 
inequality within states, where the disadvantaged majority has demanded a more egalitarian 
distribution of wealth (Kuhnle and Sander, 2010: 75–76). In modern democracies, economic 
inequality affects several areas of policy, and the public response to it is intertwined with a 
number of issues. It is related to what one believes should be done for the poorest group in 
society, and whether those with a high level of income should be separated from a small or 
large amount of their earnings through taxes and transfers. If one seeks to attain or stay in 
political power, it is highly relevant to know how the general population assesses the need for 
redistribution. Is the support for redistribution a direct response to the actual level of economic 
inequality, or are there other factors which has an impact on the support for it? The aim of this 
thesis is to examine the following inquiry: “How does economic inequality affect the support 
for redistribution in OECD1 countries?” 
One of the seminal works and theories in the research on the effects of economic inequality is 
“A Rational Theory of the Size of Government” (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Based on rational 
choice, Meltzer and Richard postulates that the average citizen’s reaction to increased economic 
inequality in a state will be support for further redistribution. This is based on the notion that 
income in a free economy will always be skewed so that a minority at the top will hold a 
disproportional amount of the wages. This formalization of what the effect of economic 
inequality is, also forms the primary basis of how I aim to understand the impact of economic 
inequality in this thesis.  
How economic inequality might impact the support for redistribution is in this thesis tested 
based primarily on rational choice. Employing multilevel modelling, the effects of economic 
inequality on the support for redistribution in OECD countries, is investigated, using data from 
the four last rounds of the World Value Survey (WVS) (2009), which is also integrated with 
recent and robust pre- and post-transfer inequality data provided by Solt (2009).  
I test two alternate forms of economic inequality, to investigate which of them shows the 
clearest connection to the actual support for redistribution. The first form of economic 
inequality is the pre-transfer level of inequality, which reflects the level of inequality before 
                                                 
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 
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taxes and transfers. The other form of economic inequality which is tested, is the post-transfer 
variation of it, which reflects the level of inequality after taxes and transfers, which is also the 
form of economic inequality which is observable in society. This step is carried out to answer 
a relevant question – what form of economic inequality is the support for redistribution actually 
a response to?  
While I primarily investigate how the support for redistribution is shaped by the level of 
economic inequality, there are other aspects of the context in which the support for 
redistribution might be shaped, that might also be relevant. One aspect of this is how the 
response to economic inequality might vary between states and regime-types , and how country-
level factors might also affect the individual’s support for welfare-policy (Jæger, 2006; 
Dallinger, 2010). In this thesis a number of factors, outside the actual level of inequality, are 
introduced to better understand what shapes the support for redistribution. Macro-factors are 
introduced, to test what impact the setting in which the economic inequality is found, actually 
has on the support for redistribution. Individual-level factors are also tested, to account for the 
notion that individual risk of needing the welfare state also mediates the support for income-
redistribution (Cusack, Torben, and Rehm, 2006).  
The primary finding presented in this thesis, is that the Meltzer-Richard logic in its original 
formalization, is reaffirmed as a predictor for the support of redistribution. This means that 
increased levels of pre-transfer inequality is associated with an increase in the support for 
redistribution. Post-transfer inequality does not show a positive or any effect on the support for 
redistribution, which indicates that the support of redistribution is best understood as a response 
to the level of economic inequality before taxes and transfers. While the M-R logic receives 
some support, this effect is not particularly substantive, and demonstrates a much smaller 
impact on the support for redistribution, than what household income does.  
Individual-level indicators indicate that people seem to re-assess their support for redistribution, 
based on whether they are more or less likely to rely on the welfare state themselves. One 
interesting interaction is also revealed, in that the level of national income is shown to mediate 
some of the negative impact of household income on the support for redistribution. Household 
income is still shown to have a generally negative impact on the dependent variable. The general 
tendency unveiled through the analysis, is that rational choice seems to offer some level of 
explanation of the support for redistribution. I will expand on these findings in the sixth chapter, 
where the conclusions of the thesis are presented.  
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The thesis is structured as follows. After this introductory chapter, chapter 2 is focused on 
theory, where a review of current research on macro-factors and how they might affect welfare-
attitudes is assessed. After the review of the effect of macro-factors, I will move on to the 
specifics of the Meltzer-Richard logic, and how it provides an extensive theory of how 
economic inequality might affect the support for redistribution. At the end of the chapter, 
hypotheses based on the Meltzer-Richard logic and other explanatory factors on the macro- and 
micro-level are specified. Chapter 3 is focused on methodology, data-treatment and variable 
specification. Chapter 4 presents a brief empirical review of the employed data, where the 
expectations of the modelling and the Meltzer-Richard logic is assessed. Chapter 5 presents the 
models, where the fit and results of the different models and their results are assessed. In the 
sixth and final chapter, the different hypotheses are assessed and discussed, with a final 
discussion on some key-aspects of the thesis, and suggestions for further research.  
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2 Theory 
How is support for redistribution shaped? The primary focus in this chapter is how different 
factors might affect how people believe that the distribution of income should be. The first part 
of the chapter will focus on how macro-factors has been found to affect welfare-attitudes in 
various research. In this section, the primary focus will be on the direct impact of inequality, 
and the effects associated with it. The next section will be focused on the state, and how the 
national setting might affect various welfare-attitude. After this review of how various macro-
factors might affect the support for redistribution, I will move on to the primary theoretical 
enquiry in this thesis – what the response to inequality might be in a rational choice-perspective, 
and how this forms the basis of the Meltzer-Richard logic as it is employed in this thesis. After 
this the difference between testing pre- and post-transfer inequality against the support for 
redistribution is also elaborated on. While a robust test of the effects of economic inequality is 
the primary enquiry in this thesis, I will also specify additional hypotheses for how the support 
for redistribution might be affected. The first part is based round micro-factors, and how they 
mediate the support for redistribution, based on whether the respondent is more or less likely to 
require the welfare state. Other hypotheses is based around the impact of various macro-factors, 
such as the economic performance and public expenses in the state.  
While I will not focus on the employed modelling or statistics at this point in this thesis, it is 
important to note that the use of multilevel modelling in this thesis, implies that a number of 
causal links can be tested. This also means that the theory-chapter will be focused on both 
macro- and micro-factors which might affect welfare-attitudes. 
2.1 Macro-factors and welfare-attitudes 
Before the review of research on macro-factors as predictors for the formation of welfare-
attitudes, an important term must be specified - the GINI-coefficient. Economic inequality is 
traditionally measured through the GINI-coefficient, where the difference in income between 
the top and bottom of a country is reflected. The GINI-coefficient was first introduced by 
Corrado Gini in 1912 (Ceriani and Verme, 2012: 421), and is a mathematical measure which 
reflects level of income-inequality a country, which in its original specification goes from 0 to 
1. A GINI-measure of zero implies perfect equality; meaning that everyone has the same level 
of income. A GINI-measure of 1 implies that one individual has all of the income (Oatley, 2012: 
349). The reader should note that even though the original GINI-measure varies between zero 
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and one, the variation I am employing is multiplied. This implies that a GINI-level of 0,2 is 
written out as 20 in the employed data and the analysis. The GINI-coefficient also quantifies 
what makes up an important challenge for any welfare state; the level of economic inequality. 
The context in which economic inequality is understood is important, and it is possible to 
quantify the level of economic inequality both before and after taxes and transfers. Pre-transfer 
inequality describes the level before taxes and transfers – post-transfer inequality describes the 
situation after. It should be noted that GINI-coefficient says very little about the absolute level 
of poverty or wealth in a country. Even if there are, at the time, severe economic issues in a 
number of OECD countries, the absolute level of poverty is probably much more severe in poor 
developing countries who has not been included in the OECD. This also emphasizes the relative 
nature of the GINI-measure. It does not describe the absolute level of poverty, it rather describes 
the relative distance between the top and bottom in terms of income.  
Most of the reviewed research on macro-factors rely on the link between aspects of the context 
the individual finds themselves in, and how this affects the individual in their formation of 
public opinion. While I will return to the specific operationalization of how I frame the impact 
of macro-factors, specifically in terms of economic inequality, there are a number of causal 
links which might be in play between macro-factors and a changes in welfare-attitudes. One 
aspect is rational choice, in that people are expected to attempt to maximise their economic 
utility, based on their economic self-interested and how the state-arrangement is at the time. 
Another is the impact of risk, and how this might affect the support for welfare-policy, where 
changes in the perceived risk might facilitate the support for policy mending it. A third way 
macro-factors might affect public opinion is though culture, political and otherwise, where the 
national history will create specific conditions for the formation of public opinion between 
countries.  
In the review of different macro-factors, I will start with a quick review of how the impact of 
economic inequality has been assessed. There is much research on the effect of economic 
inequality as a societal factor. Some have reviewed how inequality, redistribution and economic 
growth is linked. Lee (2005: 158) finds that there is an effect of public sector expansion on the 
mending of inequality, but this is an effect which is specific to fully institutionalized 
democracies. In non-democracies, the expansion of the welfare state is found to have the 
opposite effect. Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005) find that in the period between 1970 and 
2000, the pre-transfer level of inequality in affluent OECD countries has risen. At the same 
time the welfare state in the reviewed countries has increased their spending, matching the 
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increased gap in the pre-transfer state. They emphasize that this finding counters the notion that 
the welfare state has been in an state of retrenchment in the reviewed period (Ibid. 449). It has 
also been found that part of the response to macro-variables like unemployment, forms an 
interaction with the political orientation of the government, where a leftist government through 
issue-ownership might receive greater support in the face of increasing unemployment 
(Jakobsen and Listhaug, 2012). There has also been found to exist an interactive relationship 
between welfare-regimes and social expenditure, where different regime-types facilitate 
different levels of welfare-expenditures (Jakobsen, 2010). 
Others who have reviewed the effects of economic inequality are Moene and Wallerstein 
(2001). They have found that the form of redistributions and who it benefits, has a significant 
effect on who actually supports further redistribution. They point out insurance motives as a 
primary determinant in whether people support it. Others have found that the preference for 
redistribution is steered by the risk of being unemployed, an effect which is further facilitated 
if a person is in a group which is particularly exposed (Cusack et al., 2006: 373). In terms of 
how actual levels of inequality have changed in different countries over the years, one point of 
focus has been how the nature of inequality has changed during the late nighties, and into the 
two-thousands. It has been demonstrated that the main contribution to inequality is an emerging 
high-income group, which has increased their distance to those holding a low income (Lemieux, 
2008: 22). It has also been found that earned income has become the primary determinant for 
the level of rising inequality, ahead of other forms of income2. This describes a situation where 
the level of economic inequality is affected by the number of high-earning people emerging as 
an upper strata in terms of earnings in the different countries (McCall and Percheski, 2010: 
330).  
While this thesis is an investigation into how inequality affects support for redistribution, one 
issue which is highly important on the conceptual level, is whether there is an interactive 
relationship between the support for redistribution, and the level of continuing inequality. There 
is evidence supporting the notion that politicians act in accordance with public opinion on 
inequality. When there is rising support for redistribution, politician tend to act in accordance 
with this impulse. (Brooks and Manza, 2006). Why does it matter in the perspective of this 
thesis, whether inequality is removed in the long run? Kelly and Enns (2010) has written an 
article on the interactive relationship between economic inequality and mass preference. Their 
                                                 
2 Presumably other forms of income will be based on the revenue of capital investments or inheritance. 
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article reviews how there is an interlinked relationship between inequality and support for 
redistribution; economic inequality leads to less support for redistribution, while increased 
equality has the opposite effect. It should be noted that they do review inequality in the USA, 
where the changes are assessed within the country, over time. Other research has found that in 
the USA, the decisive voter is above the average income, and therefore in disfavour of 
redistribution (Paul and Verdier, 1996: 721). It has also been found that the response to 
inequality in Christian and social democracies, facilitates further support for redistribution 
(Brooks and Manza, 2006: 490). Lee (2005: 158) finds that democracy has a positive effect on 
the level of economic inequality, and it seems that the tendency is that economic inequality 
leads to redistribution in countries with developed democracies. 
At the same time, the current research does pose a number of question. One important aspect to 
keep in mind, is that the time-period and selection of countries matters. An important aspect of 
inequality is that it is fairly complex measure, which can change from time-period to time-
period, and even though economic inequality might be decreasing, it is much more difficult to 
know which groups are more or less affected by inequality. When faced with increased 
inequality, is it because the rich are getting richer, or the group of very poor people becoming 
larger? 
When reviewing countries in the European Social Survey, Finseraas (2008) finds a positive 
effect of inequality on support for redistribution, and Dallinger (2010) also finds an similar 
effect. Several of the recent articles on the effects of economic inequality has aimed to test the 
direct impact of inequality in rather extensive setups. Finseraas (2008) looks to understand 
support for redistribution in a multilevel setup. His findings show that post-transfer inequality, 
has a significant effect on the support for redistribution, but he also finds that general household 
income has an inverse effect. This connection is mediated by an interaction between income 
and the level of inequality, but his findings demonstrate that high income people are still shown 
to be opposed to be more opposed to redistribution in general. Dallinger (2010) also performs 
an extensive review that explains cross-national differences in public support for redistribution, 
on the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data-set. She investigates how regime and 
political economy approaches are both viable to try and understand differences in support for 
redistribution. Amongst other things, she to tests the government protection hypothesis3, which 
                                                 
3 It should be pointed out that the government protection hypothesis, as it is originally specified by Blekesaune 
(2007) is not based on the economic performance in terms of GDP, but rather on unemployment. While both share 
a similar causal link, it can be argued that unemployment is a more direct indicator, which also hold a much higher 
level of direct personal relevance for a person who is assessing the probability of needing the welfare state. 
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is based on the notion that the economic wellbeing of a country has a negative effect on support 
for redistribution, as it entails that people in economic upturn, has more faith in the market and 
do not need the support of the welfare state. She finds support for this hypothesis (Ibid: 338), 
as a negative effect of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is found to be significant on the support 
for redistribution. Dallinger also tests the impact of different regime-types, but find that these 
effects are decreased with the inclusion of indicators like public expenses and GDP (Dallinger, 
2010: 345). 
Dion and Birchfield (2010) carry out an even more extensive analysis of the effect of economic 
inequality, but aim to take on a wider set of data. Their primary finding is that increased income 
has less of an impact on the support for redistribution, in countries with low levels of 
development, or very high levels of income inequality. This might due to a different reaction to 
inequality outside the sphere of developed democracies, where they include data from the whole 
world in their analysis, including Middle-Eastern countries and South-America. They employ 
a wide number of countries, and aim to expand the data-set as much as possible.  
There has been various reviews of how OECD-states can be understood in a comparative 
perspective. More specifically in how inconsistent findings between different welfare states can 
be attributed to varying approaches to how social policy is carried out, rather than actual 
differences between the states. Early research on this topic demonstrates that different 
definitions of welfare efforts explains some of the variation between OECD-states. (O’Connor 
and Brym, 1988: 47–49). In more recent research, OECD countries have been compared, with 
an ongoing effort to form indicators which allow the direct comparison between countries as a 
direct motivator economic redistribution. It has also been revealed that the Nordic countries 
score well above the mean, in terms of the traditional indicators for welfare in OECD countries 
(Kalimo, 2005: 225–227). 
2.2 Support for welfare and the national context 
While the previous section was focused on the direct impact of economic inequality, and how 
this affects the support for redistribution, this section will focus on the state and other factors 
which might shape the context of how people assess the need for redistribution. The state and 
its arrangements is the context which the response to inequality is shaped within. In the next 
section I will review how the arrangements of the state, and type of welfare efforts might shape 
the support for redistribution. The welfare state is described as being concerned with three 
primary issues; protection against risks, the sense of equality and solidarity, and supplying the 
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services expected from a state body (Ervasti, Andersen and Ringdal, 2012: 3). The change of 
public policy is a granular process. It can be expected that welfare state arrangements has a 
greater effect on the individual, than one individual has on the welfare state. The state matters, 
where an issue like economic inequality is concerned, as it forms the context where the response 
to inequality, and eventual support for redistribution is shaped.  
Welfare states have been described as belonging to different regime types. There is a rich line 
of literature focused on how different welfare state regimes can be traced, which imply different 
ways in which the response to social issues might be shaped by the arrangement of it. A number 
of people have reviewed the welfare state regime-hypothesis, as it was originally formalized by 
Esping-Andersen (1990), where various permutations have been specified over the years. 
Welfare state regimes, have often been tested through their impact on different redistribution 
outcomes, and other aspects related to the welfare state, such as health-inequalities. While the 
appearance of welfare-regimes, and how they appear in terms of welfare state expenses, 
constitute one discussion, another is how these different regimes might be linked to the 
formation of public opinion. Recent articles have demonstrated that there are differences 
between states in what the level of support for welfare efforts is. While the original specification 
of the welfare state typology bundles different states into a few different groups, recent research 
has also found that it provides a better approach, to rather assess the welfare-efforts directly, 
and how these correlate with the support for redistribution (Jæger, 2006: 163; Dallinger, 2010: 
346). 
While a number of people have tried to quantify these differences in various ways, the 
assumption is that there is something specific about the type of state which is reflected in 
various macro-factors, such as welfare-expenses. If people are shaped by the traditional and 
expected role of the welfare state, in their formalization of their opinion on welfare-issues, this 
also frames how macro-factors can be expected to form public opinion (Arts and Gelissen, 
2002: 140). It has also been pointed out that there are confounding issues associated with the 
link between the type of welfare state, and the support for redistribution. It does not naturally 
follow, that the level of welfare-expenses relate directly with the support for redistribution.  
[I]t might be the case that citizens in the high-spending Scandinavian countries, compared 
especially to their fellow citizens in the Southern European countries, feel that redistribution has 
gone too far, and that this situation is reflected in their level of support for redistribution (Jæger; 
2006: 166). 
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As the above section demonstrates, there are some issues associated with employing welfare-
regimes to understand changes in public opinion. Even though someone in a country with a 
high level of redistribution might expect a rather high level of government responsibility, 
compared to citizens of other countries, they can still be opposed to the current level of it. 
Another way in which the support for redistribution might be shaped, is through the appearance 
of risk. It might be that the appearance of risk as a societal factor, might facilitate a response 
favouring redistribution.  
There are […] positive and negative aspects in attitudes concerning welfare policies. All this 
implies that studying welfare state attitudes must include perceptions of collective policy 
problems as well as perceptions of individual risks, as these make up part of the foundations on 
which attitudes are formed (Ervasti et al., 2012: 2). 
The concept of risk, as a determining aspect on the formation is employed by a number of 
researchers. Blekesaune (2007: 393) find that people in light of higher unemployment, show 
stronger support for redistribution and welfare-policy. Blekasaune specifies in this article the 
governmental protection hypothesis. He finds that increasing unemployment facilitates support 
for further redistribution. This strengthens the notion of support for redistribution as a result of 
increasing uncertainty. This also implies that economic upturn facilitates a less negative view 
of one’s own risk, resulting in less support for redistribution. Blekesaune and Quadagno 
investigates how public opinion is directly related to a factor like unemployment: 
“[U]nemployment makes citizens of modern industrialized countries aware of the fact that they 
are vulnerable to risks beyond their control” (2003: 424). This is based on a regression analysis, 
where it is revealed that increasing unemployment results in a general leftist turn when 
discussing welfare issues. This implies that people take in macro-cues about how the economy 
is doing, and following this, re-assess the chance of themselves needing the support of the 
welfare state, and in the end become more supportive in terms of welfare, and issues like 
redistribution.   
Another aspect of redistribution is whether fairness and reciprocity factor into it. One author 
who looks to how reciprocity might affect the support for welfare-policy is Larsen (2008). He 
draws on the regime-theory, and other-macro factors, but also describes some of the aspects 
which have been highlighted on the previous pages. One aspect is how the form of inequality 
shapes the response. He finds differences between regimes in what groups are viewed as 
deserving of state benefits – which can then be explained by how the national industry has been 
formed, or by what political groups have come to be most central and have the most power.  
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His modelling and analysis is focused on how differing relations within the country, affect the 
support for redistribution. This might have an effect on whether a group like the unemployed is 
viewed as deserving, based on the historical background of how workers’ rights have been 
organized. One possible causal-link is that some groups elicit greater sympathy in the face of 
economic troubles. If people identify in particular with a specific group, this might also lead to 
reassessment of the need for redistribution in general (Larsen, 2008: 23).  
In a recent paper by Leon (2012), the connection between reciprocity and support for 
redistribution is tested. His approach goes outside the regular research on redistribution which 
often employs rational choice. He highlights how reciprocity might be more powerful predictors 
for the support for redistribution. This is a claim Leon relates to the notion of fairness, and that 
people in general are steered more by what is deserved, instead of only acting out of general 
self-interest. He references an experimental setup where two people are given money to share 
between them, where one has the role of splitting the sum between them. What the experiment 
unveiled, was that the person who had the power to give himself all the wealth, relied more on 
a distribution of around forty–sixty or fifty–fift. Even when the respondent had the opportunity 
of refusing the offer, the person parsing the wealth out, went for a fairly symmetrical 
distribution (Leon, 2012: 199).  
This provides another factor which might facilitate the support for redistribution. One reason 
people might formulate their response to inequality, is that they have some inherent notion of 
what is fair. While this thesis is not formulated within the field of experimental economic 
psychology, these findings demonstrates that there are a number of factors which might affect 
the support for redistribution. 
2.3 Rational choice  
The previous sections has focused on a number of ways in which the support for redistribution 
is formed, and how various components might factor into it. While I have briefly mentioned the 
theory of Meltzer and Richard (1981) in the introduction, the following section will elaborate 
on rational choice, which is the basis on which Meltzer-Richard (M-R) logic is postulated. 
Rational choice is one of the most employed approaches when understanding the interplay 
between economic issues and public opinion. Many of the cited articles so far are based on 
rational choice, in that people are assumed to be concerned about the maximization of their own 
wealth and security.  
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In the following sections I will elaborate on rational choice and how this ties into the general 
M-R logic. It is important to note that this thesis is focused on public opinion, rather than a 
voting-outcome – I am testing the change in public opinion, not its impact on actual voting. 
There are primarily three traditional schools concerned with political opinion and vote-choice; 
the Michigan model which focuses on party-identification, the rationality model which 
presumes individuals to be rational and interested in maximizing their utility, and the structural 
cleavage-model which focuses on the historical ties of the individual and the group they belong 
to (Listhaug, 1989). The Michigan model focuses primarily on party-identification. Based on 
the notion that people are in large part affected by their social class and group attachment, it 
follows that this will also affect political opinion (Ibid: 340). The rational choice model was 
formed, in part as a response to the Michigan-model. Rational choice theory presents the 
politically minded person, as primarily interested in the greatest economic gain, and the 
presumption is that people are steered by economic voting (Ibid: 341). The Michigan models, 
build largely on the notion of groups as determinant in human behaviours. Rational choice 
theory aims to formalizes a response which is not guided by history or existing arrangements 
in society, but is rather based on what an economically minded person would do. It also serves 
as a logical point of contact between political choice and economic theory.  
Rational actor-theory narrows the political person down to the homo economicus; the economic 
man. In the formalization of the original theory, Downs’s primary approach was that the 
political system is best understood through rational actors seeking to maximise their own gain. 
(Downs, 1957: 136). My primary focus in this thesis is on the individual, and how their political 
opinions are affected from a rational choice perspective. This implies that I understand people 
as being generally concerned with the maximisation of their own utility. Rational choice theory 
is not without its fairs share of detractors, where a primary criticism is that it presumes that 
people operate with a level of information which is perhaps unrealistic. Another issue is that 
even if one presumes that people act as rational actors, rational behaviour does not necessarily 
imply economic measures as the final goal for voters (Listhaug, 1989: 344). In politics, an 
example of an issue that goes outside the traditional rational actors approach, are value-laden 
issues such as abortion or same-sex-marriage. People will probably have an opinion on these 
topics, and act in accordance with it; but this cannot be said to be led by economic 
considerations. At the same, it is possible to have a rational approach, toward non-rational goals.  
While rational choice can present some challenges; especially in cases which go outside the 
economic sphere, it also supplies a clear causal link in the formalization of political opinion on 
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issues related to income. This is directly linked to the notion of economics as being a 
determinant in political behaviour and opinion. When trying understand an issue like inequality, 
rational choice provides an interesting theoretical framework, since it is an issue which is 
primarily grounded in economy. In the formation of his approach to rational choice, Downs 
was primarily concerned with the missing link between economic theory and political choices. 
[E]conomic theory has suffered because it has not taken into account the political realities of 
government decision-making. Economists have a been content to discuss government as though 
governments were run by perfect altruists whose only motive was to maximise social welfare 
(Downs, 1957: 150). 
Downs’ contention is not that governments do not act in the interest of population. What he 
wants to address, is rather their motivation. The reason the government act in accordance with 
the public will, is not out of altruism, but rather that any government in a democracy is 
dependent on the approval of the populace. Downs intention was to find out how a merger 
between economic and political choice could be best realized, and what this could bring to the 
understanding of the politically minded person. What his understanding of the political world 
implies, is that voters and political actors aim to maximise their own benefit, and this implies 
that voters are steered by their pocket-book, and that politicians are steered by their voters.  
Research investigating the link between mass policy preference and welfare state output, has 
found that a change in public opinion on support for redistribution, can also be linked to a 
change in policy on the field. Brooks and Manza (2006: 347) find that there is a certain level of 
responsiveness in state output. They advance the social policy responsiveness hypothesis, 
which focuses on the notion that the repercussion for an electorate not adhering to public 
opinion will most likely be the loss of popular support. (Ibid: 490). This is in line with rational 
choice, in that political representatives are expected to act in accordance with popular opinion. 
But if such an effect is to be traced from economic inequality, this is dependent on the actual 
level of economic inequality facilitating support for redistribution. This is the topic for the next 
section, where the effect of economic inequality on support for redistribution is formalized 
through the logic provided by Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
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2.4 Meltzer-Richard logic and the impact of pre-transfer inequality 
The Meltzer-Richard logic, which has been widely cited in research on redistribution4, aims to 
conceptualize what a rational actors response to economic inequality actually is. Meltzer and 
Richards primary contention is that in a democracy, the median voter will support 
redistribution. This is based on the notion that the median voter will also have an income under 
the national average. This is most clearly phrased in the introduction to their article where this 
approach is formalized: “An increase in mean income relative to the income of the decisive 
voter increases the size of government”5 (Meltzer and Richard, 1981: 914). Simply put, in an 
economy without perfect equality, there will be a minority at the top, which holds a 
disproportional amount of the wages. This implies that redistribution will favour the average 
voter, as the average and decisive voter is in a disadvantageous position, as long as the average 
wage is above the median level. To specify the M-R logic, as simple as possible, the basic 
notion is that for those with an income over the average level, redistribution hurts more than it 
helps in terms of absolute gains. For those with a median level of income - the majority, 
redistribution will then lead to an absolute gain if one assumes that they see some use of the 
benefits of the welfare state. In M-R setup, where they expect the result of economic inequality, 
to be the expansion of the welfare state, this implies that those who should support redistribution 
also manage to hold a majority in an election.  
The below figures demonstrate how income-levels might be skewed. The first and second 
figures demonstrate the gap between the median and mean income-level in two different 
countries. In the figure demonstrating Country A there is a gap between the Median income, 
which is the income level of the average citizen, and the Average income level, which is higher 
due to the fact that there is majority at the top which receives a disproportional part of the 
earnings. In Country B, it is demonstrated how further inequality creates a larger gap between 
the median and average income-level. This is then expected to facilitate further support for 
redistribution in general, than in Country A. 
  
                                                 
4 Dallinger, 2010; Finseraas, 2008; Kenworthy and McCall 2008; Dion, 2010; Kelly and Enns (2010) and a number 
of others. It should be noted that it by no account has received unambiguous support, but it is still an important 
component of how people have tried to understand redistribution 
5 The expansion of the government, is then due to the increased support for redistribution, as a result of the level 
of economic inequality.  
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As M-R logic is based on rational choice, this also implies that they must assess the claim that 
people are perhaps less informed about the economic implications of their choices. Their 
counter-argument is that even if the rational voter probably does not have an interest in gaining 
full insight into what the implications of redistributional policy might actually imply in terms 
of specific technicalities, the median voters is expected to realize that they will see a gross gain, 
as a result of redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981: 924). Support of redistribution, based 
on the original formalization of M-R logic, is that the support for redistribution is based on the 
level of economic inequality before taxes and transfers. The average voter will then support 
redistribution because it lessens the gap between the median- and average-income voter, where 
the redistribution of income will lead to welfare-benefits for the whole population. This is also 
the basis on which I specify the first hypothesis. 
Figure 2.1: Illustrated figures for two possible distributions of income in a 
liberal economy (Pontusson and Rueda, 2008: 316). 
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H1: Higher levels of pre-transfer economic inequality leads to increased support for 
redistribution.  
One reason why M-R logic provides an interesting explanation for the support of redistribution 
is that it provides a universal understanding of what the effect of economic inequality might be. 
This makes sense in a setup where the impact of inequality is reviewed between countries. 
Rational choice provides an explanation of political opinion which presumably goes outside the 
cultural context which is specific to the individual countries. It also captures an important 
element of how public opinion might be formed as a response to the economic state of affairs 
in a country. The M-R logic is based on the level of inequality, and is not related to the absolute 
level of wealth in a state. Those with a lower income are always relatively worse off than the 
richer strata in a society; this thesis builds on the notion that it is the level of differences between 
the top and bottom which is decisive. This also reflects the notion put forth in the J-curve, 
specified by Davies (1962), where it is the relative deprivation which is described as the 
decisive factor when an negative reaction is provoked in the general population, based on the 
impact of social issues.  
While there are clear benefits in employing rational choice in understanding differences 
between countries, it also becomes necessary to review how well people are actually able to 
assess the need for welfare-policy. Aalberg for example, elaborates on how there are a number 
of ways in which the individual forming an opinion on welfare-policy themselves, are perhaps 
unable to make a levelled review of how the world appears around them.  
People have the facts wrong, often in systematic ways, and confidently believe they have them 
right. Moreover, their misplaced confidence leads them to resist accepting and using the correct 
facts even if these are made available. The consequence is that misinformation will have 
significant effects on attitudes towards welfare and that it will distort peoples preferences 
(Aalberg, 2003: 89). 
While this elaborates on how people perhaps do tend to have things wrong, one implication has 
to be considered. It might be that people’s ability to assess their own and others’ economic 
situation, is less than perfect. There are a number of factors which might worsen the individual’s 
ability to make a rational choice. When forming their opinion on welfare, my primary 
hypothesis only states that there is increased support for redistribution when economic 
inequality is increased. Even though there are probably some disturbances in how economic 
inequality is assessed between countries, the M-R logic predicts a common reaction to 
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economic inequality, which also forms the basis of this thesis. A very important aspect of M-R 
logic, one has to assess the level of inequality before taxes and transfer, and how this affects 
the support for redistribution. Employing the level of economic inequality after taxes and 
transfer, breaks a primary aspect of M-R logic, but it also provides an alternative understanding 
of how economic inequality might affect public opinion. This will be the topic of the next 
section.  
2.5 Post-transfer economic inequality and support for redistribution 
The original formalization of how the M-R logic is predicted to have an effect, is based on the 
level economic inequality before taxes and transfers. It is formalized around the notion that 
people assess whether or not they see an absolute gain in terms of welfare from a redistribution 
effort. This implies that the M-R logic in its pure form is based on whether the taxes and transfer 
is viewed as a benefit or not, by the average citizen. While this setup is in line with the original 
formalization by Meltzer and Richard (1981), this operationalization ignores how the level of 
economic inequality is apparent in the society.  
Testing the impact of economic inequality after taxes and transfers, breaks the pre-transfer 
assumption of M-R logic, but some earlier research has employed this approach. Finseraas 
(2008) tests the impact of post-transfer economic inequality on the support for redistribution. 
He highlights that this might be a more direct predictor for the support of redistribution, since 
it is the level of inequality which is actually observable in society. Dallinger (2010) also tests 
the response to inequality based on post-transfer numbers; “The GINI-index based on weighted 
net household income after taxes and transfers was adopted as a measure of national income 
inequality to analyse further6 redistribution” (2010:340). Other recent articles (Dion and 
Birchfield, 2010) has found significant results based on the original formalization of the M-R 
logic, i.e. based on the correct pre-transfer data. This raises an interesting question – what is the 
relationship between these two forms of inequality, and how are they linked to the support for 
redistribution. This reveals the relevance of testing both types of economic inequality against 
the same set of data, to see if there is an association between how the two measures of economic 
inequality might predict the support for redistribution.  
Conceptually, it is possible to assign the M-R logic to the post-transfer situation. If one refers 
back to figure 2.1 describing the distribution in income between median and average level, this 
                                                 
6 Emphasis in original quote. 
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figure will also describe the situation after taxes and transfers as well. It would simply reflect 
the gap median and average income after the state has carried out the act of redistribution; 
unless the economic inequality is removed, there will still be a gap. This demonstrates the 
plausibility of post-transfer economic inequality, as being determinant in the formation of 
support redistributional policy. This also matters in terms what it is most likely factors to affect 
the level of support for redistribution.  
The level of economic inequality after taxes and transfer, is what is directly observable in a 
society, and this might also make it itself apparent through societal problems associated with it. 
If one assesses economic inequality as it appears in general society, it might be that the social 
problems associated with it, is a stronger predictor for the support for redistribution. If one 
assumes that M-R logic steers the response from the average citizen to whether the richer strata 
receives a disproportionate amount of  income, it is plausible that this response is based on the 
observed level of economic inequality. This also forms the basis for the second hypothesis.  
H2: Higher levels of post-transfer economic inequality leads to increased support for 
redistribution 
The most important contribution of this thesis, is the test of both the pre- and post-transfer level7 
of economic inequality in a data-set which allows the direct comparison of the two, in the same 
data. While both approaches rest on the notion of inequality affecting the support for 
redistribution, they also rest on rather different premises.  
Support for redistribution as a reaction to pre-transfer inequality, implies that people are able 
to assess and understand the effect of redistribution on society as a more abstract term8, since 
this form of inequality is based on the differences in income before a transfer has taken place. 
This frames the support for redistribution, as a reaction based primarily on rational choice, 
where they assess whether or not they gain from the current welfare-effort.  
Support for redistribution based on the level of post-transfer inequality, implies a somewhat 
different setup. As has been noted, post-transfer inequality reflects the situation after taxes and 
transfers, and it is also the form of economic inequality which is directly observable. If support 
                                                 
7 Pre-transfer inequality or GINI-market describes the level of inequality, before taxes and transfer. Post-transfer 
or GINI-net describes the level of inequality after taxes and transfers. 
8 One operationalization of rational choice is that people do not rely on perfect information, but rather on the 
consequences they see of existing policy. This implies that the primary effect on the support of redistribution, is 
that those above the median income-level is separated from part of their income, while those below the median 
levels, is a gross-gain from the redistribution efforts, and this will affect what their level of support for 
redistribution should be (Meltzer and Richard, 1981: 924). 
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for redistribution is based on this formulation, as noted by Dallinger (2010: 340) this implies 
that people respond to whether they are in favour of further redistribution.  
 Pre- and post-transfer level of economic inequality as alternative predictors for the support of 
redistribution
 
Figure 2.2: The relationship between pre- and post-transfer inequality and the support for redistribution. It is 
important to note that I am not testing these two simultaneously, they are simply tested as two different predictors 
for the support for redistribution. 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates the relationship between pre- and post-transfer inequality, and how 
they are expected to shape the support for redistribution. It is very important to note that I am 
not testing these two measures of economic inequality at the same time, they rather act as two 
possible predictors for the support of redistribution. Post-transfer economic inequality is linked 
to the pre-transfer version of it, as it is a product of the pre-transfer level of inequality after 
taxes and transfers are introduced, as is demonstrated by the figure.  
The reason why the two causal link are interesting to test, is that it is highly relevant to examine 
what the relationship between them are. If Finseraas (2008) and Dallinger (2010) are correct, 
and people reflect their support for further redistribution on the level of observed economic 
inequality, when forming their support for redistribution, this would imply that post-transfer 
inequality is a stronger predictor for the support for redistribution. Post-transfer inequality is 
expected to shape the response to inequality by how it is directly observable. This implies that 
peoples assess the need for redistribution by the appearance of inequality in society around 
themselves. My approach is primarily to investigate what link shows the greatest connection to 
the support for redistribution.  
Support for redistribution. 
Pre-transfer 
inequality (GINI-
market) 
Post-transfer 
inequality (GINI-net) 
Taxes and transfers 
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2.6 Economic inequality, taxation, and the welfare state 
Redistribution and the M-R logic is directly linked to the welfare state, as much of the funding 
required by it, is collected through taxation of the population. Taxation is a necessary 
foundation of a welfare state – without tax-income welfare-policy is neither viable or possible. 
The redistribution efforts which a welfare state implies, also lessens this inequality, and lays 
the foundation of the modern welfare state. One important issue of income redistribution is how 
taxes affect the equation. As an example, in the United Kingdom, a third of public spending 
went towards social benefits such as unemployment benefits and support of pensioners in the 
2007–2008 period (Begg, Fisher, and Dornbusch 2008: 321–322). By comparing the pre- and 
post-transfer level of economic inequality, it is possible to assess what the impact of the 
redistribution efforts actually is. While it is possible to review differences in pre- and post-
transfer inequality between countries, it is much more difficult to assess what the proportion of 
public funds are for example used on welfare for the unemployed, if one compares inequality 
before and after redistribution.  
There are a number of ways through which the level of redistribution might be skewed. If 
benefits for the unemployed are strengthened, this would improve the situation for those outside 
of a job, but not low- or middle-level earners. But redistributional policy can also be aimed at 
other groups which might be less in need. Welfare-policy can be geared so that the middle-class 
sees greater benefit of it, which would imply that they might be less opposed towards taxation. 
If the state puts heavy taxes on the very rich, and then employs the collected means to create 
welfare-benefits that benefit the upper- to middle-class, it might be that as a consequence, 
support for redistribution is strengthened among those who are around the mean-income level, 
which then goes against the M-R logic. At the same time, tax-regimes must appeal to the 
majority, which might imply that the very rich minority will always be voted against in terms 
of redistribution.  
It should be noted that taxation is not the focus of this thesis, but it is also important to realize 
that the forms of taxation-regime will have an effect on how redistribution affects individuals, 
and in the end, public opinion. The primary relation between pre- and post-transfer inequality, 
is that taxes are introduced into the equation. There are two ways in which the form of taxation 
might be expected to affect the support for redistribution. The first is that taxation is the 
mechanism which through inequality is evened out, as it allows the siphoning of means from 
those at the top, to those lower down on the ladder. The second take-away is that even if it is 
possible to identify how the gap between the top and bottom is lessened through redistribution, 
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what form the actual type of redistribution takes on, is not possible to determine based purely 
of data on economic inequality. Since I am only reviewing the effect of economic inequality on 
public opinion, rather than a voting outcome, this means that I can review the whole population, 
rather than just those who voted. If I only looked at those who voted, it might become apparent 
that there is a line of division between those who would benefit from redistribution, and those 
who actually vote. It might be that those with a high level of political efficacy is more likely to 
vote, and this group might also be more likely to hold a high level of income.  
In the original article by Meltzer and Richard (1981), they explain the growth of government 
as directly related to the level of economic inequality. This is based on the notion that if there 
is more inequality, this leads to support for redistribution, which again leads to higher taxation, 
and in the end expands the scope of the government’s role. In a historical perspective, this can 
also be linked to how the less endowed in a society, has been able to gain greater power, and a 
stronger ability to influence policy. The formation of the welfare state implies added benefits 
for the needing (Barr, 2004: 38), which can be described as a move of wealth from the rich 
minority, to the needing majority. M-R logics describes this process as a granular change from 
high level of inequality, to a more equal society, and they also highlight that growth of the 
welfare state can be linked to more disenfranchised groups gaining political efficacy, and 
having their say in taxation and redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981: 924). One important 
distinction between their original theory, and my application, is that I only test one step in the 
causal chain between inequality and the growth of the welfare state: How does the level of 
inequality affect the support for income redistribution?  
2.7 Individual risk-assessment and the support for redistribution 
So far, I have focused on how M-R logic is expected to predict the support for redistribution, 
as a response to inequality, both pre- or post-transfer, on the national level. One reason why the 
M-R logic supplies a powerful conceptual tool is that it is based around the response of the 
average voter. But as a my review of various micro and macro-factors has revealed, there are a 
number variables which are expected to affect the support for welfare-attitudes, and in turn 
redistribution. While a number of individual-level variables has been shown to mediate the 
support for redistribution, income is especially important in relation to the M-R logic. The 
specified theory is based on the notion that the average income-person will be supportive of 
redistribution. This means that increasing income will lessen the distance to the average level 
of income in a country, and when it is reaches a certain level, places the person over the average 
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income level in the country. This means that the individual-level income, will always predict 
less support for redistribution, if one follows M-R logic. This also formalizes the third 
hypothesis.  
H3: There is a negative relationship between the level of household income and support for 
redistribution. 
The above hypothesis, along with H1, describe the primary responses facilitated by the original 
notion of M-R logic as a predictor for the support of redistribution. The average income-voter 
will exhibit a linear relationship in their support for redistribution, dependent on the level of 
pre-transfer inequality. H3 describes how higher household income, facilitates an inverse 
reaction. Both these are based on the rational actor understanding of how public opinion is 
formed, and the self-interest argument central to rational choice.  
While I thus far have elaborated on how M-R logic predicts the average response to inequality, 
based primarily on the self-interest argument, in terms of maximized personal benefit, another 
aspect of redistributional policy, is how it acts as form of insurance (Barr, 2004: 168). Without 
going into the political economy of who are more or less likely to need the aid of the welfare 
state, the notion that people are more or less supportive of redistribution based on their personal 
risk of needing public welfare, fits conceptually into a rational choice framework (Ibid: 102–
107). There are a number of variables which might affect why people are more or less 
supportive of redistribution. In existing research, it has been found that people in groups, which 
are more dependent on the welfare state, are more in favour of redistribution (Svallfors, 1997: 
294–295). His research is based within the regime-theory framework, and he therefore focuses 
on eight countries which are found in this typology. A common finding between all the regimes, 
is that people in a number of proposed risk-groups are more likely to support for redistribution 
(Ibid., 290–291). Cusack et al. (2006: 373) finds that there is a clear connection between 
belonging to a group at risk, and being in favour of government redistribution. Students, people 
in unions, unemployed, retired and women, are all shown to be in favour of further 
redistribution. Indicators which has a negative association with support redistribution are the 
level of income and if the respondent is holding a job. A wide selection of available articles has 
reviewed the effect which belonging to a risk group plays in support for redistribution, both 
directly and indirectly. By necessity, earlier research on macro-factors employing multi-level 
models, has tested a number of these causal links. One reason is that many of these indicators, 
such as gender, are natural control-variables. While there are a number of indicators which can 
be linked to insurance, another aspect is how some would see less use of the insurance aspect. 
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Both these lines of reasoning are elaborated on in the following section, where the notion of 
individual risk factors predicating the support for redistribution is formed. This also forms the 
basis of the fourth hypothesis.  
H4: Micro-level indicators facilitate a re-assessment of the support for redistribution. 
The first of the variables which are expected to shape the response to inequality in terms of a 
risk-assessment, is gender, and the role it plays in the role of welfare. It is proposed that women 
are more supportive of redistribution, because of persisting gaps in income, between men and 
women9. There are persistent income differences between women and men, but the primary 
reason this aspect is included in the analysis, is that women are perhaps more likely to be 
dependent on the welfare state. Facing a divorce, women will be more likely to require the aid 
of the welfare state. Another notion, which has been tested in earlier research, is how people 
outside of paid work are more in favour of welfare-policy. This is based on the notion that they 
do not provide their own income, and are reliant on the assistance of the welfare state. The basic 
dichotomy which is proposed, is between those who earn a living, and people outside the active 
work-force (Cusack et al., 2006: 373). 
In their basic form, the proposed causal links follows the notion that people also assess their 
future need of the welfare state when forming their opinion of redistribution. Another predictor 
for the support of the welfare state is the age-aspect. This is primarily included as a form of 
control, but is motivated by the relation between age and the welfare state. The negative effect 
of age is grounded in the notion that middle-aged people are believed to rely less on the state, 
and therefore less supportive of redistribution. A curved effect of age is also expected, as old 
people are more likely to be dependent on the welfare state, and pensions which requires a 
certain level of redistribution.  
Finally, there are two proposed ways in which the association with different groups in society 
are expected to change the support for redistribution. Both are related to whether or not a person 
is associated with organizations which hold a role outside the direct influence of the welfare 
state. The first hypothesis is related to religion. Finseraas (2008) finds that religious attendance 
has a negative effect on support for redistribution. Scheve and Stasavage has written an 
extensive article on this subject, and found that religious people are less dependent on the 
welfare state, and perhaps view it as an alternative safety-net, to that provided by the welfare 
                                                 
9 Esping-Andersen has been criticized for failing to review this aspect in his research on welfare-regimes, and the 
effects gender inequality has on the general level of inequality (Arts and Gelissen, 2002: 142). 
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state (Scheve and Stasavage, 2006: 255). Religious attendance is then expected to lower the 
support of redistribution. 
An opposite effect is associated with whether the respondent is a member of a trade-union. This, 
like religion, implies a connection to an organization outside of the state. While religion can be 
described as an alternative solution to the issues faced by the welfare state, union-membership 
is historically linked to the formation of it. Countries with strong-workers union, has historically 
developed larger welfare states. I am not reviewing the relation between welfare state 
development, and the size of unions, but I do assume that union-member are more positive 
towards redistribution (Begg et al., 2008: 225). This is based in the notion that unions are 
usually based around groups interested in redistribution. People who are associated with either 
the church, or member of a union are then expected to re-assess their need for redistribution. In 
the case of the church, it might act as an alternate form of insurance, instead of the welfare state. 
Union-membership has the presumed opposite effect, While union-membership might serve as 
an alternative network for security, it also has a historical connection to the notion of 
redistribution, and the support of it.  
2.8 Other macro-effects on the support for redistribution 
The hypotheses so far, has been focused on the impact of inequality in a rational choice 
perspective, based on the M-R logic, and whether the individual has a greater chance of needing 
the welfare state and therefore re-assess their support for redistribution. As my review of macro-
factors and the role of the state in redistribution demonstrates, there are factors outside of 
rational choose which are also expected to shape the level of support on welfare-issues. One is 
the government protection hypothesis (Blekesaune, 2007) that postulates that the economic 
performance of the state, might affect the preference for welfare-policy. One way of assessing 
the performance of the economy is the through the GDP, and this forms the basis of the next 
hypothesis. It follows the notion that in times of better economic performance, there is less 
support for the redistributional policy of the state, as people has greater belief in the market, 
and are less concerned about the efforts of the welfare state, which the redistribution efforts 
lays the foundation for. This also formalizes the next hypothesis.  
H5: An increase in the level of GDP lessens the support for redistribution.  
Another aspect which is tested, is the impact of the welfare state, and how its output is expected 
to shape the response to inequality. This is conceptualized through how welfare states makes 
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itself apparent, and how this is expected to affect the individual in their support for 
redistribution. One of the most persistent indicators of the welfare state, is the level of public 
expenditure. A “learning”-effect is then hypothesized to be apparent from the level of public 
expenditure, where people support the level of public expenses which the welfare state has 
facilitated up until this point (Jæger, 2006). Public expenditure is expected to be fairly constant, 
and as people are accustomed and reliant on the different services of the state, this is expected 
to also affect the support for a redistribution in a positive direction. 
H6: There is a positive linear relationship between the level of public expenses as a percentage 
of the GDP, and the support for redistribution. 
While much of the research on the support for redistribution is based around rational choice, 
and how people, act based on the self-interest argument, there are also confounding factors in 
how people has been shown to form their support for redistribution. Finseraas (2008) finds that 
people in a setting of high levels of inequality, and a high level of personal income, 
demonstrates  a mediating positive effect on the support for redistribution. Even though this 
does not make up negative effect of income, on the support for redistribution, it also goes 
against the purely rational approach, which is traditionally used to understand the support for 
redistribution. As my quick review of how reciprocity might shape the support for redistribution 
showed, it is also possible that factors outside of rational choice, predicts some part of the 
response to economic inequality. Are there settings where people are more concerned about 
what is assumed to be fair, rather than being steered by self-interest (Leon, 2012). This causal 
link is examined through a hypothesis which aims to test the effect of having a high level of 
national and personal economic security.  
H7: A high level of national economic safety decreases the negative effect of household income 
on the support for redistribution. 
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2.9 The proposed causal-model 
 
 
 
The above figure (2.3) demonstrates how the different factors are expected to impact the support 
for income redistribution. If one conceptualizes a setup where some aspect of what determines 
the response to inequality is fairly constant, such as the level of actual inequality, national 
income, and public expenses, these factors can be expected to shape the baseline response to 
inequality. Just as the national average response to such an issue is not expected to change 
much, neither do these indicators. Individual-level indicators can then explain the variation 
around this mean.  
One of the primary pursuits in research on political attitudes and behaviours is to reveal general 
patterns of public opinion. As Arts and Gelissen (2002: 139) have put it “There are good reasons 
to argue that the comparative macro-sociology is still in statu nascendi” 10. This thesis provides 
an approach which builds on, and improves on the research of others, as research on macro-
factors are in large part an iterative process.  
                                                 
10 “Just born”. 
Support for income- 
redistribution 
GDP 
Pre-transfer 
economic 
inequality 
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Figure 2.3: Factors expected to affect the support for redistribution. Pre- and post-transfer economic inequality 
is not tested at the same time. The stippled lines from the welfare state to post-transfer inequality and public 
expenses, reflect how both measures are a product of the welfare-effort. The stippled line from GDP to Household 
income represents the proposed interaction between the two variables. 
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The primary focus of the theory-chapter, has been to address how rational choice and the M-R 
logic both are expected to affect the support for redistribution, while other factors have been 
reviewed as possible mediators for the bottom-line effect of economic inequality. The baseline-
effect of M-R logic presumes that the level of economic inequality before taxes and transfers is 
the primary motivation in the formation of an opinion on redistribution, but I also test how the 
level of inequality after taxes and transfers might serve as an alternative predicator for the 
support of redistribution.  
GDP is expected to have a negative effect on support for redistribution, but it is also presented 
as a potential interaction with household income. The stand-alone effect of income and GDP is 
then expected to negatively affect the support for redistribution, while the interaction between 
them, tests the impact of having a very high level of economic security both on the micro and 
macro-level. The risk-mediating micro-factors are introduced to show how individual-level 
variables are expected to shape the reliance on, and support for the redistribution effort.  
It should also be noted that both post-transfer economic inequality and public expenses are 
shown to be partly a product of the welfare state, as the national arrangements will affect these 
indicators. While the figure below illustrated the hypotheses tested in this thesis, they will also 
be presented at the end of the discussion-chapter, where a review of whether they are confirmed 
or not is presented.   
29 
 
3 Methodology 
In the following chapter two important aspects of this thesis will be elaborated on. The first is 
the methodological approach. The second is the treatment of data and how the data is assembled 
for my analysis.  
3.1 Statistical method and multilevel modelling 
Economic inequality, as employed in this thesis, is represented through a statistical measure, 
namely the GINI-coefficient, both in its pre- and post-transfer form. While it is important not 
to exclude possible approaches to any research-question, a measure such as economic inequality 
does have a natural link to statistics. When understanding the effects of economic inequality, 
statistics also provide some primary advantages. Since I am interested in inequality on a general 
level, it makes sense to review a large number of units, and how the response to inequality and 
support for redistribution varies between contexts. Where statistical methods are concerned, the 
most simple form is purely descriptive. While descriptive statistics can give a general insight, I 
am interested in the effects of inequality on the support for redistribution, and how this effect 
might be mediated by other factors.  
When one moves beyond the field of descriptive statistics, it is possible to assess correlations 
within the statistical material. (Ringdal, 2007: 239). If one believes that there is theoretical 
grounding for why one variable should have an effect on the other, the regression analysis 
becomes a relevant tool. I am interested in the personal response to economic inequality. This 
implies a methodological approach which takes into both personal factors, and factors in the 
surrounding context, such as the level of inequality on the national level. What is then the best 
way of modelling the effects of economic inequality, based on inferential statistics? One 
approach is presented through multilevel modelling. This is an estimation technique which 
takes into account the hierarchical nature of data from several groups of units, when running an 
analysis which compares them. (Strabac, 2012: 205). The main advantage of multilevel 
modelling, is that it allows the analysis of units nested within different contexts. This allows a 
form of analysis which aims to draw conclusions based on a larger set of data. This method also 
supplies comparability between context. As it allows the review of a large number of units, it 
is possible to make generalizations which applies on a more general level, between several 
different contexts. 
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Multilevel analysis is for most intents and purposes identical to the Ordinary Least Squared 
(OLS)-regression, in terms of how the coefficients are interpreted. The primary difference is 
that it allows the review of how factors in the context the individual finds themselves in, affects 
individual-level factors (Hox, 2010: 1)11. It also allows much more advanced models than OLS-
regression, in that it is possible to test the variance of individual variables over different 
contexts, but this is also dependent on more comprehensive data.  
The primary assumption of the multilevel model is that it must have an hierarchical structure; 
where units must be nested into an overarching structure. The classical example is pupils, nested 
within classes, nested within schools. A key aspect is that one level must be nested within 
another. Using data which has a structure such as this, it is also possible to assess whether there 
is variance between the different classes, and the different schools. On the macro-level, it is 
possible to introduce variables, which describe the macro-context, such as aspects which vary 
between groups. In the example where schools, classes and pupils make up the hierarchical 
structure, the analysis of academic performance can then account for what part of the variation 
of the pupils performance can be attributed to the different context. Some of the variation in the 
pupils performance might be due to differences between teachers, which would account for the 
class difference, but there might also be variation between schools, which also impact the 
performance of the pupils. This method also accounts for how much of the variance is found 
on the school-level i.e. the level above class-level in the described example (Strabac, 2012: 
225). 
3.2 Assumptions of multilevel models 
The main purpose of multilevel-models is that it can account for the fact that units are found 
within different context when doing research. It is relevant to test how factors describing the 
context people find themselves affects individual-level measures, but the introduction of macro- 
or context-variables is not viable in an OLS-regression. This is because the standard-errors will 
be underestimated. What the OLS-regression ignores, is that the macro-level variables does not 
constitute an unique observation for each unit. If hierarchical data is employed, such as 
individuals within countries, the level of GDP is not an observation specific to the individual, 
but rather the group (country-level in this case) they reside within. While this is a somewhat 
complicated way of explaining this, the most important take-away message is that multilevel 
                                                 
11 Level 1: Individual-level, Level 2: Country-year, and Level 3: Country-level. 
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methods controls for the issues faced when using OLS-regression with macro-variables (Hox, 
2012, 11–59). 
While the level of significance is an important aspect of the output in the multilevel analysis, 
what one can draw from the significance statistics is in part dependent on the number of units 
on the different levels. The number of context on the macro-level also limit the number of 
variables which can be introduced at the same time in the analysis. A rule of thumb is that one 
variable per ten units is appropriate, but there is not a consensus on this point either. It is 
recommended to have at least ten units on the macro-level for an analysis, i.e. ten different 
context, but more is always better in terms of how many variables can be introduced on the 
macro level (Strabac, 2012: 208).  
3.3 The multilevel equation 
Since the previous section presented multilevel analysis in a rather abstract way, I will now try 
to explain the multilevel analysis in more direct way, which also give the reader insight into the 
specifics of the multilevel equation. The notation in the following section, and elsewhere in the 
thesis is based on (Strabac, 2012: 209–226). In this explanation of the basic of the multi-level 
equation, I will refer to individual nested within countries, but I will also demonstrate how the 
modelling technique matching my data-structure is performed, which based on three levels.  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
The above equation demonstrates a two-level equation for a dependent variable which varies 
between countries. 𝛽0𝑗 reflects the average value for the country j. 𝑒𝑖𝑗 represents the residual 
for the individual i in country j. This takes into account that there is variance between the 
country, represented by 𝛽0𝑗 while there is also variation between the individual-level units, 
represented by 𝑒𝑖𝑗.While the country level is represented only by 𝛽0𝑗 in the first equation, there 
is also an residual term associated with the country level in my example. This is described 
through the following equation.  
𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑗 
𝛽0 represents the average value between the countries, while 𝑢0𝑗 represents the residual for the 
individual countries. This means that a final equation for the multilevel structure can be 
specified. This then incorporates the two above equations into one.  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗 
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The above equation represents a data-structure with individuals (e) nested within countries (j). 
My data has a structure where individuals (e) are nested in country-years (j), within countries 
(v). This creates the following equation.  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝑢0𝑗𝑘 + 𝑣0𝑘 
In this equation 𝑣0𝑘 represents the country-level residual. Another important aspect of 
multilevel modelling, is how much of the variance is found on the other levels. One reason why 
multilevel models is an interesting estimation technique, is that it allows the estimation of 
variance on the different levels. This is presented through the Variance Partition Coefficient 
(VPC). This might sound like a rather alien measure, but it is employed to find the level of 
variation which is located on the different level. It is not particularly difficult to calculate, and 
presents what percentage of the variance can be explained by factors over the individual-level. 
The formula for the VPC found on Level 2, or country-year-level, can be specified through the 
following equation. 
𝑉𝑃𝐶 (𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙 2) =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0𝑗𝑘)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑘) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0𝑗𝑘) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣0𝑘)
 
The VPC, as it is produced by the above formula, can then be multiplied by a hundred, and this 
gives us the percentage of variance which is found on the prescribed level. By switching out 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢0𝑗𝑘) with 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑣0𝑘) above the line, in this equation, it is also possible to determine how 
much of the variance is found above the country-year level, on the country-level. It should also 
be noted that the different variance-term as they are presented in the regression, does not need 
to be re-calculated to gain any meaningful information from them. One can simply assess 
whether there is any change in them, between the models, but the VPC provides a relative 
measure of change in variance found between the different levels.  
3.4 Micro- and macro-variables in multilevel models 
In a setup, such as the one I am employing, micro-level variables are often based on a 
representative cross-section of the population, where surveys from different countries and time-
points are employed. Macro-level variables often describe actual properties of the macro-level 
unit, such as the level of gross domestic product or the national level of unemployment. It is 
also possible to aggregate the responses on individual-level measures, to the macro level, but 
this produces a less reliable measure. It is for example possible to include a variable for 
unemployment on the individual-level, and a variable describing the national level of 
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unemployment. It is less ideal to include unemployment on the national level, if there is not any 
data for this on the individual-level (Hox, 2010: 2–3).  
While multilevel models often contain a very high number individual-level units, the units on 
the levels above are often more limited. The macro-units in my statistical material makes up a 
modest number of units, and this limits the possibility of highly significant findings (Strabac, 
2012; 206-207).  
Another aspect of multilevel research is that individual-level has a considerable higher chance 
of becoming significant. Considering that a multilevel data-set covering several rounds of data, 
on a worldwide scale, can contain more than 30000012 level-1-units, one can attain very 
accurate measures about what individual-level variables mean on a general level. This also 
implies that there are more stringent demands to significance on the individual-level (Strabac, 
2012, 213). When performing research on a population, normally the number of people included 
are usually around 1000-1500, as this serves as a natural number of people to interview, while 
also attaining a good chance of uncovering significant results, given that there is variation in 
the material of substantive interest. (Field, 2009: 42).  
It should also be noted that the high-level of individual-level units, allows a high chance of 
significant findings where micro-level variables are reviewed, but these effects are not 
necessarily of substantial interest. It is also sensible to review variables which describe actual 
aspects of the respondents, rather than attitudes, as this lessens the cultural impact on what the 
effect of a variable might be, between different contexts. 
Validity captures whether the researcher measures what he or she in fact is interested in 
examining (Ringdal, 2007 86-87). Does the employed methods and data, measure what is 
prescribed from a theoretical point-of-view? One issue in multilevel research, is that a number 
of factors must be taken into account through the research-design. My primary investigation is 
to see how inequality affects support for redistribution, but this hinges on the notion that there 
is a connection between the two. The primary issue present in this thesis, is that even though 
the level of inequality is treated as shaping the response in form of support for redistribution, 
the analysis is still only be based on 66 country-years, consisting of observations from a total 
of 26 countries. Considering there are so few countries available in the analysis, it is important 
                                                 
12 This is the number of total respondents in all rounds of WVS. 
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to note which level of generalization one can operate with. This means that the test of M-R 
logic and other factors facilitated is primarily relevant for OECD countries.  
Reliability in multilevel research is a somewhat complex topic. Whether data is reliable, 
depends on whether the method of measurements can be trusted from an instrumental point-of-
view (Ibid.: 87). This becomes an especially important issue, as multilevel modelling relies 
heavily on comparable data. In this case, problems with data is mostly revealed through issues 
on survey-side of things. There might be issues with people not knowing the answers to 
questions, or not being willing answer them, but considering so many units are available, this 
should not pose a challenge. What can pose a serious challenge in multilevel research, is the 
comparability between surveys. One such issue is how some variables has been specified 
differently between the different waves. One such example, and a quite serious one at that, is 
the household income measure employed in the World Value Survey. I will return to this in the 
model-specification. Finally, one issue which is both related to validity and reliability, is how 
questions might take on different meaning between countries. There might be cultural 
sensibilities which affect certain variables in a number of ways. For example, when asking a 
person in Germany what their opinion on inflation is, their answer might be coloured by 
Germans historical experiences with it. On my dependent variable - the support for income-
redistribution, such confounding factors might be in play.  
3.5  On the Employed data 
As I have mentioned, I am employing the WVS-data. Some adjustment has been performed, so 
that it can be employed in a multilevel setup. A number of books and articles on statistics are 
referred in the literature list, even though they are not mentioned in the text. They have been 
used primarily as guidance in some of the more advanced parts of data-treatment, and in the 
solving of various statistical challenges (Hamilton, 1992; Hamilton, 2012; Midtbø, 2012; 
Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). 
One of the most important aspects of multilevel analysis is which units are sensible to compare 
on a conceptual level. A key question then becomes whether the researcher is comparing 
differences or similarities between the countries. My reason for comparing OECD countries, is 
that they are presumably fairly similar, and expected to have reached a certain threshold of 
economic and democratic development, and they already make up a set of units which earlier 
research has been based around (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001; Kalimo, 2005; O’Connor and 
Brym, 1988; Pontusson and Rueda, 2008).  
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As I have mentioned, multilevel-models allows the review of units nested within an hierarchical 
structure. In my case, this hierarchical structure is individuals, nested within country-years, 
nested within countries. While this mean that I am employing a three-level analysis, I am 
primarily interested in the two lowest levels – individual and country-year. This means that I 
can introduce variables on the lowest level which predicts a change in the support for 
redistribution, based on individual-level variables. I am also introducing variables on the 
country-year level. This means that variables such as GDP, which will vary between different 
country-years can be introduced. I am employing an integrated version of WVS-survey, where 
several rounds of the survey are included for most of the countries. The multilevel analysis, 
allows me to review what level of variance there is between the different country-years, which 
is a significant strength of this method.  
While this approach supplies an expanded data-set, over what a purely cross-sectional approach 
would provide, there are some inherent statistical limitations. There are a limited number of 
units available, and this implies that employing random slope models becomes an unviable 
approach. To employ random slope models, it is recommended to have at least a hundred units 
on the macro-level. (Hox, 2012: 235).  
In selecting the countries for review, I have only included countries which were part of the 
OECD at the time of those rounds which I have included. This means countries like Hungary 
and Poland are excluded up until the point where they entered in 1996, even though rounds of 
the WVS where carried out in some countries before this. Focusing only on EU-countries for 
example would exclude some highly developed and interesting countries, and it would also 
include countries which are outside of the OECD as of today.  
What are the consequences of the chosen modelling, and how does multilevel models fare 
against other model-types in relation to economic inequality. One aspect of my analysis is that 
I am not testing the change between time-periods. Several countries are included through 
several survey-rounds. In economic theory it is often common to employ longitudinal data for 
the same set of units, but this implies repeated observations for the same set of units over quite 
an extensive time-period. I cannot, with either great reliability or certainty test if there is a 
convergence between the level of inequality, and the support for redistribution for example. It 
is highlighted as a strength of multilevel models that there can be asymmetry in the included 
groups, without this creating any statistical problems (Strabac, 2012: 207), and this allows me 
to employ several rounds of WVS-data in my analysis. 
36 
 
I have also integrated new data, into the version of the WVS I am employing. Through the 
SWIID-dataset set provided by Solt (2009), I have been able to manually integrate more recent 
and robust economic inequality data. He aims to ease the utilization of inequality data, in 
advanced statistical modelling, and also handles a number of the issues pointed by others like 
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), who focuses on how different forms of inequality-data is 
treated as equal measures: “For example the official series may refer to income before tax (as 
in the United States) or to disposable income (as in the United Kingdom)”(pp:772). The data 
provided by Solt provides this distinction. Another step he has performed is to estimate a more 
reliable measure for both pre- and post-inequality. This allows comparison of inequality both 
before and after redistribution, which allows me to perform a more stringent test of what the 
effects of different types of inequality actually is.  
I am measuring the effect of economic inequality in a setup comparable to Finseraas (2008) and 
Dion and Birchfield (2010) for example, but an important distinction is that I am employing a 
more solid set of inequality-data as provided by Solt (2009). 
I am also testing the effect of public expense on welfare-attitudes. This facilitates the integration 
of public-expense data in my data-set. When integrating expenditure data, a more direct, if 
somewhat rougher approach has been chosen, than what has been employed on the inequality 
data. Going to the OECD’s pages describing public expenditure as an percentage of GDP, I 
have integrated the available data with my dataset. The main issue is that expenditure data is 
only available for five-year intervals. (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005), while the data from the WVS 
was carried out in different countries, on varying time points for the different waves. This means 
that there is public expenditure data available, which roughly, but not exactly, matches the 
round of WVS-data available. My chosen solution has been to employ the data on public 
expenditure, which was gathered closest to that round of the world-value survey (OECD, 
2013)13. While a more robust approach would have been to interpolate the chosen data between 
the five-year points in time, and then integrate with the employed data set with a one-year lag, 
I believe my approach is sufficient, for the chosen inquiry. Expenditure is a largely stable 
measure, perhaps even more so than inequality. Barring a revolution or major political upheaval 
in a country, public expenses one year is expected to closely correlate with the previous. Since 
these are OECD countries, national stability is expected, and I would therefore argue that they 
                                                 
13 Expense data from 1990 matched with survey-data from 1992 etc. If data from the previous year was not 
available, data from the year before that was inputted, if that data is not available, data from the year the survey 
was carried out, was employed. 
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are fairly reliable from a conceptual point of view. The primary question is whether interpolated 
data would facilitate a stronger statistical approach. As public expenses is  shown not to offer 
significant improvement of the model, further treatment of this data is not particularly relevant 
for statistical enquiry. This leaves the focus on the public expenses as rather perfunctory.  
3.6 Model specification 
The following section goes into the specifics of how the models are specified. This is done to 
supply a clear overview of the employed variables for the reader. The above section was focused 
on how the data was integrated, the following section is concerned with the modelling efforts.  
My dependent variable is retrieved from the World Value Survey, and asks where the 
respondent places themselves on a one to ten-level variable. Answering one (1) implies the 
respondent agrees fully with the statement “We need larger income differences as incentives” . 
Answering ten (10) on the variable implies full agreement with the statement, “Incomes should 
be made more equal”.  
An important point of discussion, when assessing the dependent variable, is whether it describes 
a response to the current level of redistribution, or the ideal level of redistribution. (Aalberg, 
2003: 104–110). M-R logic implies that the response to this question is based on whether the 
respondent sees greater utility from redistribution being carried out. That the dependent variable 
is a reflection of actual inequality is also a necessity, given that I test the response to two types 
of economic inequality – pre- and post-transfer. This matters, because the response to pre-
transfer inequality implies that people assess the actual levels of inequality before taxes and 
transfers when forming their opinion on redistribution. The post-transfer response to inequality 
is rather a response to the inequality as it appears in society around the individual.  
Others has employed a combined measure for welfare-attitudes in comparable research. While 
the use of a combined measure can be a way to attain more robust measures (Ringdal, 2007: 
85), I would also lose the theoretical strength of the direct connection between inequality and 
support for income redistribution. Another issue is whether the dependent variable reflects the 
individuals opinion on economic inequality as an societal issue. My approach implies that a 
positive answer on this variable reflect support for redistribution, but it can also be read as 
reflecting what people believe should be done about absolute differences in income, in terms 
of actual wages. Still, I would argue that it captures whether or not the respondent believes that 
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economic inequality should be mended or not, regardless of whether this is through an 
redistribution effort, or more equality in terms of wages. 
It should also be noted that even though the dependent variable has ten categories, it is in reality 
a categorical variable (Ringdal, 2007: 81) While this might be, I will treat it as a continuous 
variable for the purpose of this analysis, as it is fairly normally distributed, and has more than 
five categories. It is presumed that it represents an underlying continuous variable for the 
support of redistribution14 (Strabac, 2012: 207). 
3.6.1 Specification of the micro-variables 
There are several considerations which come into play, where my micro-level variables are 
concerned. Primarily they function as control-variables. One of the most important advantages 
associated with multilevel modelling is that allows models which account for differences, which 
in purely macro-perspective would only reviewed as national aggregated means. With a 
multilevel approach, these differences are made to be a part of the analysis, and work to 
strengthen the result. 
Women are included to capture gender-differences. This is a dummy-variable, where women 
are anticipated to be more in favour of redistribution efforts. Unemployed is coded as a dummy-
variable, which categorizes the respondent as having a job or not. A positive readout on this 
variable, implies that the respondent does not have a paid job. The variable is coded as follows: 
0 represents that the respondent either has full- or part-time job, or is self-employed. 1 means 
that the respondent is retired, a housewife, student, or unemployed. While some might have an 
issue with students being categorized with other people with less social mobility, I would argue 
that students are clearly dependent on the state, much more than those actually holding a job. 
Union-member, is the next variable, and describes whether the respondent is part of a labour 
union. Age and Age-squared are primarily included as control variables. Age-variables are often 
included to test for a generational shift, in that people from some generations might have shared 
experiences which later generations does not have. This aspect is not included in this thesis, as 
I am including data from several time-points. Without an introduced control for the time-
difference, the employed analysis does not capture an eventual temporal aspect of the data. 
Another reason for my inclusion of Age and Age-squared, is the problematic nature of the 
education-variable in the employed data-set, which means I am unable to control for the actual 
                                                 
14 The multilevel analysis is dependent on normally distributed error-terms and not normally distributed variables 
in general. 
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level of education. One of the primary strengths of this thesis, is that I am employing multilevel 
setup, where several rounds of data are employed. While this approach allows the employment 
of a wide set of data, this also relies on data being highly comparable between rounds. The 
inclusion of the education-measure in the data-set, is not included for a number of countries for 
the survey-round carried out in 1990, which leaves out most of the countries, except South-
Korea. This also affects the results and leaves out a considerable chunk of data, which happens 
in an unbalanced way. More data is lost in the early waves, implying that the loss of units affects 
the results in a rather serious way. While this is an unfortunate effect, the Age-variable might 
capture some of an presumed education effect. Age is also presented as a squared term. This is 
done to capture an eventual old-age effect on support for redistribution. Religious attendance 
is my next employed variable. It is employed as it is presented in the WVS, but reversed so that 
high values imply that the respondent often attends church, which simplifies the interpretation 
of the variable. Technically speaking, this is a categorical variable. Even though it has a logical 
zero-value, there is not an identical gap between the different categories15. When analysing the 
results, this has the consequence that an increase in one step on this variable, cannot be 
interpreted in any meaningful way, besides whether it is significant or not, and the direction of 
it.  
Household income is an particularly important variable, related directly to the M-R logic. It is 
based on household income after salaries and pensions, but before taxes and other deductions. 
The basic premise of the M-R, is as earlier noted, that the average voter will always benefit 
from redistribution, because there is a rightward skew in how the wealth is portioned among 
the population a liberal society. This implies that there is a negative relationship between 
support for redistribution, and having an income above median. The variable is distributed over 
ten categories, and does not describe the actual level of income. It rather describes the household 
income relative to the national level. This is also part of the reason why curved effect is not 
possible to model or test. One issue with it is that it is not a particularly trustworthy measure, 
as it is specified in the WVS-survey. There is variation between the surveys in how income-
variable has been specified. One approach has been that the investigators has presented the 
respondent with a ten-point income-bracket with actual values specific to the country, wherein 
the respondent is asked to place themselves. Another approach has been to ask the respondent 
where they assume that they are related to the rest of the nation, which produces a distribution 
                                                 
15 The categories are as follows for the variable “How often do you attend religious service?”: Never practically 
never, Less often, Once a year, Other specific holy days, Only on special holy days/Christmas/Easter days, Once 
a month, Once a week, More than once a week. 
40 
 
with a heavier concentration around the middle values. Finally, the third approach has been to 
ask the respondent to themselves specify their household income, whereby the investigators has 
created a distribution afterwards. The final approach is the most troubling, in that how 
investigators choose to distribute the actual level of income, has a severe effect on how the 
income seems to be distributed in the population. If they use the original ten-point bracket based 
on income from an earlier survey, this means that inflation will affect the results adversely, and 
show a rightward skew. The other approach, wherein the income-categories are distributed into 
ten equal groups, removes information about whether the variable is normally distributed 
(Donnely and Pol-Eleches, 2012: 4–8).  
 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of Household income in Norway, for the different rounds of the World Value Survey 
(Donnely and Pol-Eleches, 2012: 34). 
As the figure 3.1 shows, there are sources of uncertainty in how the variable is measured 
between the waves. It should be noted that I am using data from Norway, only for 1990, 1996, 
and 2007, but the variation between the waves illustrates the issues with the variable and how 
it has been measured. 
Even though the Household income -variable presents some clear methodological issues, it also 
provides a measure which provides comparability between the different contexts. In table 3.1 
descriptive statistics for the individual-level-variables, which are employed in the modelling, 
are presented. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics, individual-level variables. 
Variables Mean S.D.  Min. Max.  Skew Kurtosis 
Support for income 
redistribution 
5.33 2.77 1 10 0.17 1.95 
Woman 0.51 0.50 0 1 - - 
Unemployed 0.43 0.49 0 1 - - 
Union member 0.19 0.39 0 1 - - 
Religious attendance 3.89 2.53 1 8 - - 
Household income 4.96 2.57 1 10 0.29 2.14 
Age 44.22 16.69 15 98 0.39 2.25 
N for all variables: 77575. People with missing on any of the variables has been filtered out for the purpose of 
the analysis. Skew and kurtosis is left out for variables which are dummies, or are not expected to have a normal 
distribution. Descriptive statistics for the unfiltered versions of the variables are found in the appendices. 
Unfiltered descriptives for the variables are found in the appendices, table 8.2. 
 
3.6.2 Specification of the macro-variables 
Since inequality is of primary interest in this paper, I have integrated and employed robust data 
on pre- and post-transfer economic inequality. Both these variables, alongside with GDP, are 
employed in a lagged variation, where data from the previous year is employed to predict the 
effect in the year of employed survey. I have also integrated data on public expenses as part of 
the GDP. In the following section, I will quickly review the macro-level variables, and how 
they integrated into the model. Pre- and Post-transfer economic inequality are coded inn for all 
reviewed units. GDP has been converted into Gross domestic product per capita in thousands 
(GDP1000). It reflects the level of GDP in 2005 dollars per capita, and It will be referred to as 
GDP1000 from this point on. I have reviewed the distribution of both the regular and Ln-
transformed version of GDP, in the selected countries, and the non-transformed version is 
revealed to be more normally distributed than the transformed version. Public expenses: This 
variable is measured in a form which reflects the level of public expenses as percentage of the 
GDP. Random-effect parameters are also included in the analysis. These show up in the 
regression model, as Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 random effects-parameters. The first level 
describes the amount of variation found on the individual-level, the second the variance found 
on the country-year level, and the final one, the variance on the country-level. I have elaborated 
on what these terms mean in the chapter on multilevel analysis, but these are also especially 
important when the changes in the models are reviewed. The most important aspect of these 
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measures, is that they describe the amount of variance found on the different levels. If they 
become lower with the introduction of explanatory variables, this means that they explain part 
of the variation on the prescribed level. The Level 1 parameter describes the variance between 
the individual-level units, while Level 2 describes the variance between the different country-
years, and Level 3 describes the variation between the countries, as units in which the country-
years-groups are bundled within.  
Table 3.2: Descriptives statistics, macro-varibles. 
Macro-variables Mean Std. Deviation Min. Max. 
GDP1000 25.89 8.73 8.38 53.32 
Pre-transfer Inequality 43.11 4.89 30.16 51.82 
Post-transfer inequality 30.33 6.29 21.12 49.13 
Public Expenditure 18.84 6.83 3.24 32.00 
N for all variables is 66 (The number of level 2, country-year contexts). Public expenditure is specified in 
percentage of the GDP. 
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4 Empirical review 
The purpose of the following section is to review the employed data, before the focus is moved 
to the regression-analysis. This step is carried out, to give the reader a general oversight of what 
findings might be unveiled through the actual regression.  
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of the dependent variable. 
4.1 Reviewing the dependent variable 
An interesting aspect of the dependent variable, is that there is a quite a heavy concentration 
around the top and bottom-point. This might be an design-effect, in that people who are 
particularly happy or unhappy, with the current level of redistribution might express this level 
of unhappiness by exhibiting an exaggerated opinion if they are for or against redistribution. 
While this affects the regression-adversely, there is not a heavy concentration on one side.  
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Household income. 
4.2 Reviewing the Household income-variable 
Another important theoretical variable, is the Household income-variable. Reviewing the 
distribution of it, one interesting aspect quickly becomes apparent; for whatever reason, more 
people are placed below the average income-level, than above it. As I pointed out in the model-
specification, there are a number of issues with the Household income-variable. (Donnely and 
Pol-Eleches, 2012). This problematizes an important issue in the employed data, and an issue 
which is also related to this thesis. M-R logic implies that people are able to assess the impact 
of redistribution on their economy. But this also means that they should be able to assess 
whether they have a level of income which is lower or higher than the average income. Even 
though this variable is adversely affected by how it has been measured, in terms of inflation 
and other issues, it might also reflect how people are not perfectly able to assess their economic 
well-being. Some of those people who fall in the lower categories, must by necessity have a 
higher level income than the national mean. The leftward skew of the variable, is primarily 
interesting because it highlights that the researcher must at least be careful in analysing the 
results of the Household income-variable. There are two probable reasons for the leftward skew. 
There might be a trend among those answering the question - in that some groups believe that 
the earn less than they actually do. The other explanation is that Household income-variable is 
miss-estimated for some of the rounds of the WVS, because of design-errors on the part of those 
carrying out the survey. This lowers the reliability of the income-variable, in how it predicts the 
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support for redistribution. It also demonstrates how the comparability of the employed data, is 
especially important in multi-level research, especially when the impact of a variable like 
Household income is employed between different context. 
4.3 Pre- and post-transfer economic inequality and average support for redistribution 
On the two following pages, two different figures are presented. They show the average 
distribution of the dependent variable, against the level of Pre-transfer inequality and Post-
transfer inequality, for the different countries, averaged between the different rounds they have 
participated in the WVS. This means that for countries with several data-points, the average 
value between them is employed. This presentation should not be mistaken for an actual 
regression, such as it is performed in a multilevel-setup; it only presents the average values on 
the two variables for the selected countries in the data-set. Having said that, this presentations 
gives a precursory insight into what the relation between inequality and support for 
redistribution is in the selected data. Bounds on the table has the same points of reference, so 
that they are directly comparable. The full list of individual country-years is found in the 
appendices, in table 8.1.  
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Figure 4.3: Average level of pre-transfer inequality against the support for income redistribution. 
Figure 4.3 presents the relation between averaged pre-transfer inequality and support for 
redistribution. Here a slight positive relation can be traced, as exemplified by the mean line, but 
this is not a very impressive effect. Going to figure 4.4, describing post-transfer level of 
economic inequality, a huge level of change is not revealed, but a slight negative shift is 
demonstrated. The figures show that there is variation between the countries, but that the mean 
demonstrated in both figures, are rather even. What the figures do demonstrate is how the 
different countries are placed, in terms of actual inequality and the national means – and over 
several years for some of the countries.  
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Figure 4.4: Average level of post-transfer inequality against the support for income redistribution. 
One interesting aspect of these two tables, are that they presents differing mean-lines, in that 
the pre-transfer inequality demonstrates a slight positive effect, while post-transfer inequality 
implies a slight negative relationship between the two. This reveals a potentially interesting 
dynamic, even if the effect seems to be very small. 
While these average value-figures do not imply a particularly strong connection between 
economic inequality and the support for redistribution, in either specification, an important 
reservation should be taken. A primary aspect of multilevel analysis is that one can control for 
both individual and macro-level variables. To review the effect of inequality, based purely on 
the above figures, implies that factors like the compositional effects of the population in the 
different countries are lost. The same happens to other possible macro-level effects, and the 
differences between the different country-years. To test the effect of inequality sufficiently, it 
is necessary to introduce control-variable which can give us an exact insight into the specific 
effects of the different forms of economic inequality.  
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Reviewing these two presentations of the pre- and post-transfer level of inequality, also reveal 
another interesting aspect in the data. Specifically, it presents to what degree redistribution is 
actually apparent in the different countries. Mexico does for example not show much of a 
change at all, while most of the other countries, show a strong movement towards much lower 
inequality, in the post-transfer figure. It also seems like the redistribution efforts are pretty 
similar between the countries, but there also seems to be a greater level of spread after taxes 
and transfers. This implies that the redistribution effort varies between countries. 
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5 Modelling and analysis 
5.1 Modelling 
On the next two pages the different multilevel models are specified. As with all statistical work, 
a number of other possible models has been tested. As is specified in the chapter on methods, a 
number of indicators must be checked to test the model fit. Standard errors are included with 
all variables, while the level of significance is noted by one, two or three stars. The variance-
measures are noted, along with their standard deviations. The Log Likelihood is also reported, 
where the change in variance and Log Likelihood will be reviewed in the discussion of the 
different models. A Log Likelihood closer to zero implies an improvement in the model, while 
a decrease in the Level 1-,2-, or 3-variance, implies that introduced variables explains some of 
the variance on that level.  
The first aspect of the multilevel analysis is to test the empty model, to see whether there is 
substantial amounts found on the levels above the individual-level. Using the VPC, which is 
discussed in the chapter on multilevel models, the variance for the three levels in the empty 
model are as follows. Level 1: 7.211: Level 2, 0.334 and Level 3: 0.145. This allows the 
calculation of how much variance is found on the different levels, and it is revealed that that 
around 93.88 percent of the variance is found on the individual-level. This is by no means 
surprising, given that personal indicators are in large part expected to be decisive in the 
formation of political opinion. 4.30 percent of the variation is found on Level 2, which is the 
country-year level. Finally 1.82 percent of the variation is found on the Level 3, country-level. 
This implies that the empty model demonstrates that just over 6 percent of the variation is found 
above the individual-level – this means that 6 percent of the variation in the support for 
redistribution can be attributed to differences between contexts. While this might seem like a 
modest amount, it is arguably enough to warrant further enquiry into how macro-factors affect 
support for redistribution. The empty multilevel model is also found to be an significant 
improvement contrasted to the OLS-version of it, implying that there is an hierarchical structure 
to the data. On the two following pages the eight specified models are presented. 
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5.2 Results 
Inn all the of the specified models, each of the individual-level variables demonstrate significant 
effects. Women demonstrates a positive effect on support for redistribution, as does 
Unemployed and Union-member. All of these are dummy-variable, implying that they generate 
a “one-time” effect – either you are a woman or not. Religious attendance demonstrates a 
negative effect, but it is only possible to state that it is negative, because of how the variable 
has been employed. As I have mentioned beforehand, I have treated this as a continuous 
variable, even though it in reality is categorical. This means that a significant negative effect of 
Religious attendance on the support for redistribution can be traced, but the effect of coefficient 
cannot be taken into account at face-value. Finally, Household income is shown to have a 
negative effect on support for redistribution. All individual-level variables, are shown to be 
significant on the 0.01 level16, while Age and Age squared, show an inverse of the expected 
effect. The Age-variable only became significant when the squared form of it was introduced 
to the analysis, but it does not represent a substantially interesting effect. The first model is 
important because it acts as a point of reference for the later models. To compare the models, I 
will compare the change in Log Likelihood, which is employed to check the model fit.  
In the multilevel analysis, the change in variance-terms is also an important part of the analysis. 
Since all individual-level variables are included in the first model, the level of explained 
variance on the individual-level does not change between the models. It is also possible to 
calculate how variance the first models explains, compared to a model without any explanatory 
variables. The Level 1-variance for the final model is 7.008, while it in the empty model is 
7.212, leaving a difference of 0.204. Dividing the difference on the individual-level variance 
found in the empty model, and multiplying this with a hundred, supplies the amount of total 
explained variance on the individual-level, which amounts to 2.8 percent. This implies that 2.8 
eight percent of the individual-level variance, is explained by the micro-level variables I have 
included.  
Model two, three, and four each introduces one macro-variable each – Public expenditure, 
GDP1000 and Post-transfer inequality respectively. None of these demonstrate an significant 
effect on the support for redistribution. Each model only adds one variable to the individual-
level-model. This is done to test the significance of them individually, to form the basis for 
further model specification. Out of the models, neither of them show much change in the log 
                                                 
16 Which is also advised in research employing multi-level models, since there are so many units on the individual-
level, and it is important to have reliable variables before the inclusion of macro-level variables (Hox, 2012: 55).  
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likelihood, where the greatest change is found between model one and three. The change in -2 
log likelihood (-2ll), the measure used to compare models directly, reveals that the difference 
amounts to 1.44. Testing this change against the chi-square distribution, with one added degree 
of freedom, reveals that this change is only significant on the 0.250 level, which cannot be 
described as an substantial improvement, meaning that the above-mentioned macro-factors has 
little effect on the support for redistribution. 
Model five tests both GDP1000 and Post-transfer inequality, but this does not constitute an 
improvement of the model. Model six introduces the Pre-transfer inequality variable, which 
demonstrates a positive change in the models which is significant on the 0.10 level, which is 
acceptable when employing macro-factors in a multilevel setup (Strabac, 2012: 206). 
Model seven introduces GDP1000 alongside Pre-transfer inequality. This constitutes a slight 
improvement in the model fit, but not one that is significant. The final and eight model 
introduces an interaction between GDP1000 and the Household income-variable. This 
represents an substantial improvement in the significance of the model.  
Pre-transfer inequality is shown to be significant. This findings is also robust to the inclusion 
of the GDP1000 variable in model seven, even if Pre-transfer inequality drops from 
significance at the 0.05 to 0.10 level.  
5.3 Summary of results 
Before going into the theoretical discussion about what the models actually show, a short 
summary of the results are in order. Going through the different model-specification some 
slight, if significant results are revealed. The individual-level variables mediate the support for 
redistribution, but the effects are not particularly ground-breaking. While an inverse effect of 
Age and Age-squared is demonstrated, from the originally expected effect, this cannot be 
described as  a substantially-interesting effect. 
Household income is shown to be the strongest predictor found in analysis, and it is also part of 
an interaction with the level of GDP1000 in the final model. Out of the macro-variables, Pre-
transfer inequality, is the only macro-variable variable which demonstrates an significant effect 
on the support for redistribution, beside the interaction between GDP1000 and Household 
income. While this makes up an significant effect, the substantial impact of it should also be 
reviewed. By reviewing the pre-transfer inequality in Norway for 2007, which is 45.6 (Found 
in the appendices table 8.1) and multiplying it with the coefficient for Pre-transfer economic 
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inequality, an effect of 1.41 is found the dependent 10-point variable. It should be noted that 
the lowest level of pre-transfer inequality found in the data is found in Belgium in 1990, with a 
score around 30.0. This means that if the impact of Pre-transfer inequality is to be assessed, 
one has to take into consideration that no-one has a score of below 30.0. It should also be noted 
that the level of economic inequality within a country, between different country-years will be 
expected to be somewhat close, and it not likely that the level of pre- or post-transfer inequality 
will vary very much between different time-points.  
It is also interesting to find that in a setup where other possible macro-variables are found to be 
insignificant, there is still a significant and positive effect of Pre-transfer inequality on the 
dependent variable. As I am operating with only 66 Level 2 units (country-years), this means 
that the effect I significant, despite the availability of a rather limited set of discrete contexts.  
Finally, an interaction between the Income and GDP1000 is also revealed. This demonstrates a 
significant effect. The below figure demonstrates how belonging to different income-groups, 
and the national context might affect the support for redistribution. It show that those holding 
a high level of income, becomes more supportive of redistribution, when the level of GDP1000 
increases. At the same time, it should be noted that this effect is not especially substantial – it 
does not make up for the negative effect of Household income as a predictor for how the support 
for redistribution is shaped. 
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Figure 5.1: Interaction between level of national income, and household income. Top line shows the effect of 
increased GDP1000 for those with a low income. Middle line for those with an average income, and the bottom 
line describes those with a top-level income. 
The above figure demonstrates the impact of national income in an interaction with the level of 
household income. It also demonstrates how income by itself affects the support for 
redistribution. The lowest line shows the impact for those holding a top income, while the top 
line demonstrates the effect for those with the lowest income. This means that the difference 
between the top and bottom line, show the relative difference between groups in their support 
for redistribution. Even when there is a high level of GDP, the difference between the top- and 
bottom-income in their support for redistribution, makes up two points in difference on the ten-
point dependent variable, which is a substantially larger effect than the impact demonstrated by 
pre-transfer economic inequality.  
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6 Discussion and conclusions 
In the following chapter I will discuss, summarize, and conclude this thesis. Before the 
conclusion, there will be a short section describing how further research on the effect of 
inequality might best be approached.  
6.1 Review of theoretical findings 
H1: Higher levels of pre-transfer economic inequality leads to increased support for 
redistribution. 
This hypothesis is conformed, in that a positive, if slight effect of pre-transfer economic 
inequality on the support for redistribution is revealed through the modelling. That the 
performed analysis includes other mediating factors for the support of redistributions, implies 
that M-R logic is robust even when controlling for other variables which are expected to shape 
the level of support for redistribution.  
While the unveiled effect is in line with the original formalization of M-R logic, the substantial 
impact is less impressive. In chapter 4, a quick empirical review was carried out, and it was 
demonstrated that even if there seemed to be a slight positive effect of the average level of pre-
transfer inequality on the support for redistribution, it did not seem to be a particularly 
substantial relationship. Through the multilevel analysis the effect of pre-transfer economic 
inequality is not found to be very strong, after other predictors has been controlled for as well. 
The choice of reviewing OECD countries is based on the notion that a certain level of 
development and democracy is needed to facilitate the M-R response to economic inequality, 
which is in line with findings by Lee (2005) and Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005), and this 
might explain part of the reason why these findings are shown to be significant. 
As I discussed in the summary of the results, other predictors seem to have a greater impact 
than M-R logic – household income seems particularly important as a predictor for how the 
support of redistribution is shaped. But this also goes in line with notion of rational choice as a 
primary predictor for the support for redistribution. That an significant effect pre-transfer 
inequality is demonstrated, indicates that the logic presented by Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
also translates into political opinion, in a setup where the response is tested in contexts with 
variation between them. 
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H2: Higher levels of post-transfer economic inequality leads to increased support for 
redistribution 
One of the primary tests in this thesis, is of the impact of post-transfer inequality on the support 
for redistribution, as an alternative to pre-transfer economic inequality.  No significant effect of 
the post-transfer inequality was uncovered, and there seems to be no connection between post-
transfer economic inequality and the support for redistribution. There are several reasons why 
this test is relevant. One line of enquiry is what facilitates the response to inequality. Post-
transfer inequality describes the level of economic inequality after taxes and transfers. That this 
measure does not show an effect on the support for redistribution, implies that people do not 
seem to take into account the perceived level of economic inequality, during the formation of 
an opinion on what level of redistribution there should be. As pre-transfer inequality is 
demonstrated to be a significant predictor, this implies that M-R logic and rational choice plays 
a larger role, than the impact of perceived economic inequality.  
Post-transfer inequality does not exhibit a significant effect in my modelling, but this might 
also be because it is a measure which is badly fitted for comparison between contexts. As I have 
discussed, tax-regimes and welfare-efforts will vary between countries. If Dallinger (2010) and 
Finseraas (2008) are correct in their assessment that M-R logic can be employed when using 
post-transfer data, this ignores the fact that various types of welfare-regimes, and tax-regimes 
will affect what further redistribution actually implies for the individual.  
H3: There is a negative relationship between the level of household income and support for 
redistribution. 
The final way in which the M-R logic is tested in its direct form, is through the household 
income-variable. The linear version of the variable shows a significant negative effect, which 
does go in line with M-R, in that rational actors are adverse against losing their wealth. This is 
the individual-level variable which is of primary interest, and shows a clear negative effect on 
the support for redistribution. While there are some methodical issues with this variable, it is 
interesting, in that it shows more direct effect on redistribution than the national level of pre-
transfer economic inequality does, which also indicates that it is a clear predictor for what an 
individual believes is the correct level of redistribution.  
That people support redistribution based on their own income, is in line with earlier research 
on redistribution (Dallinger, 2010; Finseraas; 2008; Dion and Birchfield, 2010), and also 
reaffirms the rational choice approach in understanding how the support for redistribution is 
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shaped. It is interesting to note that while the impact of pre-transfer economic inequality, and 
an increase in household income, are both expected to affect the support for redistribution based 
on rational choice, household income demonstrates a much stronger effect. While the negative 
impact of household income is quite strong, the positive effect of pre-transfer inequality is more 
muted. This implies that even if both causal links predicts a response facilitated and understood 
through rational choice, the impact of household income shows a stronger effect. The level of 
household income also has a greater chance of changing, than the national level of economic 
inequality, both pre- and post-transfer, which makes it a highly relevant variable.  
Even though the bottom-line effect of income is negative, I will return to this variable, as it is 
involved in an interaction with the GDP. 
H4: Micro-level indicators facilitate a re-assessment of the support for redistribution.. 
Individual-level variables are included to test how the increased or decreased risk of needing 
the welfare state, impacts the support for redistribution. Women are shown to be more 
supportive of redistribution, and being unemployed is also shown to have a significant positive 
effect. It is also revealed that gender has a greater effect on support for redistribution than 
unemployment. That these effect are shown to be significant are in line with research on the 
field (Cusack et al., 2006; Svallfors, 1997).  
The age-variables both show significant effects, but inverse of what I had expected. At the same 
time, the effect of age is very subdued, and the squared form of it has hardly any effect at all, 
which means that little can gathered from this finding on the substantial level. 
Church-attendance and membership in a trade-union follow the expected effect. The effect of 
religious attendance is in line with earlier findings, amongst those of Finseraas (2008) and 
Scheve and Stasavage (2006) which show that going to church might lessen the support for 
redistribution, since it serves as an alternative safety-net, lessening the individuals reliance on 
the welfare state. Being part of a trade-union is shown to demonstrate a positive effect on the 
support for redistribution. 
That individual-level variables also affect the support for redistribution, also reveals an effect 
which is in line with rational choice-logic, if one extends this approach to also include the notion 
of risk as a predictor for the support of redistribution. While the impact of individual-level 
variables, outside of the income-variable, is not directly related to M-R logic, it also serves as 
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a control for whether a country has a large group of unemployed people, or others who more or 
less have a need for the redistributional efforts of the state.  
H5: An increase in the level of GDP lessens the support for redistribution. 
This hypothesis is based on GDP as a macro-cue in the formation of the support for 
redistribution. This variable is found to be insignificant. The prescribed hypothesis implies that 
economic wellbeing affects the support for generalized welfare-attitudes, as higher national 
earnings are associated with greater economic safety and stability. My operationalization relies 
on the interplay between economic performance and support for redistribution. Theoretically 
speaking, it seems that the people do not see a lesser need for redistribution, in times of solid 
economic performance, at least in the employed data. The hypothesis states that increased 
economic performance should lessen the support for redistribution, but this effect is not 
traceable in the statistical material, and implies that people in the reviewed context do not use 
this as a cue for whether there is need for more redistribution.  
Earlier research has found that economic performance plays a role in the formation of public 
opinion, but such an effect is dependent on a direct link between the macro-variable  and micro-
level. That a significant effect of GDP on the support for redistribution, is not found, goes 
against Dallinger (2010) as an example, but this might also be due to a lacking association 
between the two in the countries I have reviewed. A primary reason why I wished to investigate 
the impact of pre-transfer economic inequality on the support for redistribution, is that they are 
conceptually and theoretically linked. The support for redistribution can be directly framed as 
a response to the level of inequality, while the connection between economic performance and 
the support for redistribution is less direct. In the original formalization of the Government 
protection hypothesis, Blekesaune (2007) investigates the link between unemployment and 
support for welfare-policies, which might provides a more direct association, than what GDP 
and support for redistribution does.  
H6: There is a positive linear relationship between the level of public expenses as a percentage 
of the GDP, and the support for redistribution. 
This is another hypothesis which does not gain support. The primary reason this variable is 
included, is to test whether actual welfare-expenses has on the support for redistribution. The 
primary reason I have included it, was a control for how the welfare-efforts might affect the 
support for redistribution.  
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As is pointed out by Larsen (2008) there are differences between countries in how deserving 
and underserving groups are assessed. A country might have a high level of public expenditure, 
even though redistribution is an unimportant issue in the national context. There might be a 
high demand and support for issues which goes outside the sphere of redistribution and how it 
is assessed. The level of public expenses and the post-transfer level of economic inequality are 
both clearly dependent on how the welfare state is organized, but these variables do not reflect 
how this organization is carried out. Public expenditure will target people differently, between 
the different national context, and is therefore a weak predictors in this form, which might also 
explain the lack of significant results.  
H7: A high level of national economic safety decreases the negative effect of household income 
on the  support for redistribution. 
One of the more interesting findings in this thesis, is the interaction between the level of 
personal income, and the level of national wealth. The interaction (Shown in figure 6.1) reveals 
how rich people in very rich countries, are more adverse to inequality than rich people in less 
wealthy countries. Statistically speaking, this is not a response to the actual level economic 
inequality, but rather an interaction between national and household income on support for 
redistribution. This demonstrates how the support for income redistribution might be 
understood, based on the national setting, but independently of the actual level of economic 
inequality. 
How can this effect be understood? The low and median income groups are still more 
supportive of redistribution overall, but this effect interaction demonstrates that the national 
income mediates the negative impact of household income on the support for redistribution. 
One possible explanation for this finding, is the notion of reciprocity as a determinant for the 
support for redistribution, as it is discussed by Leon (2012). It might be that an individual in a 
setting of higher national economic safety, is less concerned about their own income, and more 
concerned about whether the level of redistribution is fair.  
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Table 6.1: Review of hypotheses. 
Review of hypotheses  
H1: Higher levels of pre-transfer economic inequality leads to increased 
support for redistribution. 
 
H2: Higher levels of post-transfer economic inequality leads to increased 
support for redistribution 
 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the level of household income 
and support for redistribution. 
 
H4: Micro-level indicators facilitate a re-assessment of the support for 
redistribution. 
 
H5: An increase in the level of GDP lessens the support for redistribution.  
H6: There is a positive linear relationship between the level of public 
expenses as a percentage of the GDP, and the support for redistribution. 
 
H7: A high level of national economic safety decreases the negative effect of 
household income on the  support for redistribution. 
 
6.2 Summary of hypotheses 
In the table 6.1, the different hypotheses are reviewed. The primary findings unveiled, is that 
rational choice, through the original formulation of the M-R logic, and based on pre-transfer 
level of inequality - and personal income, are the primary predictors for the support of 
redistribution uncovered in the analysis. Perceived economic inequality, based on the level 
inequality after taxes and transfers does not exhibit an significant effect, and neither does other 
proposed macro-factors, such as the level of national income or public expenses. Micro-level 
indicators does seem to modify the support for redistribution, based on how they affect the need 
for welfare state. A confounding effect is found in the interaction between national income and 
the impact of household income on the support for redistribution; it seems like a high level of 
national economic safety mediates the negative impact which household income demonstrates 
on the support fro redistribution.   
6.3 Contrasting pre- and post-transfer inequality 
Why does pre-transfer inequality shows a significant effect on the support for redistribution 
while the post-transfer level of economic inequality does not? M-R logic in its original 
formulation is based in a simple rational choice-setup: A person is asked whether they support 
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a redistribution effort. The average respondent then answers yes, because she holds an median 
income, and realizes at the same time that those in the upper strata is taking relatively large 
piece of the pie. In a free economy, income will be skewed so that the minority at the top holds 
a greater part of the wealth. If there is increasing inequality, and the rich are getting richer, she 
would reply by supporting further redistribution, as this would be a way to gain from the wealth 
of the emerging upper class.  
If one employs M-R logic in a post-transfer situation, the situation becomes much more 
complex. First off, the differences between the top and bottom income level is narrower. The 
top strata has already parted with some of their wealth, lessening some of the distance between 
the top and bottom. The average voter is also less secure about whether she will see a gain from 
further redistribution. She knows that she is paying taxes, and that those with an above-average 
income does as well, but she is also less sure about a further redistribution effort will affect her. 
Will she for example see a gross gain or loss, if the tax-rates are increased. In the contexts I 
have employed, a number of different tax-regimes are probably in play, confounding the effects 
even further, which then means that the post-transfer level of economic inequality, reflects a 
situation which is less to ideal to compare between context. 
While pre-transfer economic inequality does show a significant effect on the support for 
redistribution, it is also necessary to assess the context which this response is formed within. 
As has been found by Kenworthy and Pontusson (2005), the expansion of the welfare state has 
largely matched the rising level of economic inequality in developed democracies. This means 
that in those countries where there is a widening gap of pre-transfer inequality, this is evened 
out by continued redistribution, which might explain why there is more support for 
redistribution efforts in countries where there is a larger level of pre-transfer economic 
inequality. When this variable exhibits an positive effect in the modelling, this might be an 
expression of support for an ongoing redistribution effort. 
6.4 Factors outside rational choice and their impact on the support for redistribution 
While this thesis is primarily based in a rational choice backdrop and how different measures 
of economic inequality affects the support for redistribution, one issue which has only been 
percussively investigated is the notion of reciprocity as a determinant in the support of 
redistribution. Recent research has found support for reciprocity as a determinant in economic 
theory, and this might explain some of the variation in support for redistribution (Leon, 2012). 
About 94 percent of the variation on my dependent variable is found on the individual-level, 
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and it might be that the focus on the macro-level, as the determinant for support for 
redistribution, is less than ideal. The strongest determinant on the support for redistribution has 
been shown to be the level of household income, which is and individual-level variable. While 
no statistical model can be expected to explain all the variation found on a phenomena, it must 
also be considered that the nature of the statistical method in this thesis and the employed theory 
is limited in how much it can explain. M-R logic explains an ascent toward redistribution, but 
as the modelling has revealed, this is simply a slight tendency, and it seems  not to be what 
shapes the bottom-line response to inequality. 
While further research is needed to identify what lies behind the remaining variation found on 
the macro-level, between different contexts, it might be that a large part of it is due to the fact 
that very different contexts are included in the same analysis. Rational choice is dependent on 
solid information for the individual making an assessment, and information and framing might 
play a significant role in how an issue like economic inequality is understood. There might a 
number of factors which affect the way in inequality might be assessed, and these are not 
necessarily linked to the actual level of inequality as well. All country-specific contexts and 
effect are not possible to include in a multilevel analysis, and might also explain why the 
introduced macro-variables has so little impact on variance between contexts. The test of other 
macro-factors was facilitated to account for the context for which the support for redistribution 
is shaped within, but these variables are also perhaps too superficial to gain proper insight into 
how economic performance and national welfare-issues are expected to shape the support for 
redistribution. As I have already mentioned, it is expected that the level public expenditure in 
some way or form is expected to impact some of the support for welfare-policy. A low or high 
level of expenses in a particular policy-area, should at least be expected to affect the demand 
for some adjustment in the welfare state, but these effects are probably not captured by a 
variable describing the general welfare state-expenses such as I have tested them.  
6.5 This thesis as a contribution to the current research 
My primary approach in this thesis, has been to facilitate a thorough investigation of how 
economic inequality affects the support for redistribution in a smaller and more homogenous 
group of countries, than other similar research-approaches (Dallinger, 2010; Dion and 
Birchfield, 2010). By comparing OECD countries which has been included in the WVS, and 
integrating several rounds of the survey, I have been able to investigate a simple causal link in 
an extensive data-set; How does the level of economic inequality directly affect the support for 
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redistribution? By focusing on this group of countries, I build on earlier research, which has 
found that the response to economic inequality in the form of the support for redistribution, is 
most apparent in developed democracies (Lee, 2005; Brooks and Manza, 2006). I have also 
integrated more recent and robust economic inequality data, and been able to test both pre- and 
post-transfer versions of it. The primary finding is that there is a slight positive effect of pre-
transfer inequality on the support for redistribution, which is in line with M-R logic in its 
original formulation . This reaffirms earlier research (Dion and Birchfield, 2010), but this also 
shows that the demonstrated effect is not particularly impressive. In a group of countries where 
this effect is expected to be a primary determinant, it does not demonstrate a particularly 
substantial effect. Post-transfer inequality is also tested as predictor for the support of 
redistribution. This does not show a significant effect, which goes against Finseraas (2008) and 
Dallinger (2010). This might be due to a number of reasons. As it is not in line with the original 
M-R logic this creates a less solid foundation for how this might form the support for 
redistribution. There are also some issue on the conceptual level; one is how redistribution 
efforts will vary between contexts. The post-transfer level of inequality reflects how the income 
distribution is after taxes and transfer, but does not reflect the severity of the transfer-effort, or 
whether further redistribution can be expected to have a similar effect between contexts.  
In summarizing the effects of the variables, and the reviewed hypotheses, the final models has 
not shown great power of explanation. My chosen approach of reviewing fairly similar 
countries, in terms of development and democracy has strengthened the theoretical 
expectations. Even though there can be substantive differences between countries in what 
people assess the correct level of redistribution should be, it is also possible that the assessment 
on average will draw towards the mean. A similar effect can be expected if one compares the 
support for left or rightist parties between countries. Even though the context of the left and 
right will be very different from country to country, it can be expected that a similar distribution 
is shown between them. Employing M-R logic also leaves out that redistribution is an important 
political issue in many countries, reflecting an important cleavage of the political landscape. 
What one believes is the correct level of redistribution can be framed as an economic issue, but 
it can also be related to what a person believes is the correct level of government intervention.  
This thesis also serves as a reminder of how important correct data is when employing rational 
choice-theory. That I have employed recent and robust, pre- and post-transfer inequality data, 
on the same data-set also contributes to the current understanding of how economic inequality 
might affect public opinion. As the analysis demonstrates, the response to the level of economic 
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inequality before and after taxes and transfer is not comparable in my data. This advices future 
research to be accurate in the employment of economic inequality-data. A measure like 
economic inequality is closely tied to the welfare state and policy – but it also matter how it is 
understood and contextualized. If one relies on M-R logic to understand the impact of economic 
inequality, it is particularly important to employ correct pre-transfer data.  
6.6 Suggestions for further research 
One of the recent studies, listed in the review of existing research on the impact economic 
inequality, examined the relationship between economic inequality and the policy-mood in the 
USA over an extended period (Kelly and Enns, 2010). In this article the change within the same 
setting is examined over time. In future research, it would be interesting to review how the 
policy mood changes over time in other countries, with other welfare-traditions than what is 
found in the USA. As I have mentioned, one confounding issue in this thesis is that countries 
are compared, regardless of their tax-regime, and the actual level of redistribution. If a 
longitudinal analysis of one country was carried out, this would imply that it would be possible 
to control for the effects of tax-regimes and what welfare state arrangements are in place as 
well. This would allow an assessment of the dynamic relationship between economic inequality 
and support for redistribution in a setting where tax-levels and welfare can be controlled for. 
By carrying out an investigation similar to that of Kelly and Enns (2010), but in the context of 
the different welfare state regimes  – as specified by Esping-Andersen (1990) for example, this 
would allow a more direct assessment of what the dynamic relationship between economic 
inequality and support for redistribution is. 
Another aspect which is briefly touched upon in this thesis is how reciprocity rather than 
rational choice might facilitate a reaction to economic inequality. What rational choice leaves 
out, is the notion of fairness as a predictor for the support of redistribution. By employing 
rational choice, one runs the danger of evaluating everyone as attempting to maximize their 
only their own utility, and not the utility of others. One very interesting approach would be to 
try an unveil those mechanisms which facilitate reciprocity as a response to inequality on a 
more general level. Factors which facilitates reciprocity are difficult to quantity, but would 
perhaps also explain more of the variation in the support for redistribution, than what rational 
choice has shown to do in this thesis.   
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8 Appendices 
Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics for the different Level 2, country-year units. 
Country, Year 
Aggregate 
support for 
redistributi
on 
Pre-transfer 
Inequality 
Post-transfer 
Inequality 
GDP1000 
Public 
Expenditure 
Australia, 1995 5.42 41.14 29.10 26.26 16.2 
Australia, 2005 5.35 42.93 31.06 33.61 16.5 
Austria, 1990 5.58 46.84 30.09 24.88 23.8 
Austria, 1999 6.40 43.34 26.17 29.69 26.5 
Belgium, 1990 5.11 30.16 23.20 24.45 24.9 
Belgium, 1999 5.48 47.78 25.89 28.31 25.3 
Canada, 1990 4.22 38.39 27.26 27.31 18.1 
Canada, 2000 5.64 43.11 31.09 31.12 16.5 
Canada, 2006 5.38 43.00 31.92 35.00 16.9 
Czech Republic, 1998 4.82 35.56 25.37 16.15 19.1 
Czech Republic, 1999 5.53 36.55 25.45 16.04 19.1 
Denmark, 1990 4.55 46.68 25.81 25.11 25.1 
Finland, 1990 4.37 36.77 21.12 23.48 24.1 
Finland, 1996 6.83 39.73 21.70 21.97 17.5 
Finland, 2000 6.44 44.53 23.85 26.17 24.2 
Finland, 2005 6.01 48.65 25.20 29.92 26.2 
France, 1990 5.85 38.81 28.70 23.82 25.1 
France, 1999 6.13 44.43 24.30 26.70 28.6 
France, 2006 5.94 51.17 28.00 29.81 30.1 
Germany, 1990 4.23 44.93 25.70 24.61 22.5 
Germany, 1997 6.08 46.15 27.59 28.04 26.6 
Germany, 2006 6.66 51.82 28.45 31.38 27.3 
Great Britain, 1990 4.47 46.35 31.97 23.63 16.7 
Great Britain, 1999 5.32 47.94 34.24 27.75 18.6 
Great Britain, 2006 5.58 47.77 34.60 32.69 20.5 
Ireland, 1990 4.64 45.45 32.94 16.22 17.3 
Ireland, 1999 4.83 43.27 33.02 27.27 13.4 
Italy, 1990 5.12 42.76 30.30 23.62 19.9 
Italy, 1999 4.98 46.44 34.60 26.36 23.1 
Italy, 2005 5.07 45.97 33.80 28.17 24.9 
Japan, 1990 5.30 35.57 28.66 24.75 11.1 
Japan, 1995 5.50 38.67 27.75 27.14 14.1 
Japan, 2000 5.19 38.25 31.27 27.86 16.3 
Japan, 2005 4.83 37.50 30.28 29.74 18.5 
Mexico, 1990 5.03 48.59 46.60 9.797 3.3 
Mexico, 1996 5.10 50.94 48.31 9.949 4.3 
Mexico, 2000 5.86 50.09 49.13 11.49 5.3 
Mexico, 2005 4.91 47.56 45.80 12.30 6.9 
Netherlands, 1990 4.84 39.40 25.79 25.40 25.6 
Netherlands, 1999 4.84 40.17 24.12 31.41 19.8 
Netherlands, 2006 5.42 50.38 26.75 35.10 20.7 
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New Zealand, 1998 5.59 42.84 33.03 20.72 21.3 
Norway, 1990 4.95 40.98 23.33 31.62 22.3 
Norway, 1996 5.70 46.16 23.80 37.52 23.4 
Norway, 2007 5.92 45.64 24.64 48.00 21.6 
Poland, 1999 4.90 39.91 29.55 10.73 20.5 
Poland, 2005 4.20 47.97 32.00 13.30 21 
Slovenia, 2005 6.26 40.97 23.10 22.52 21.1 
South-Korea, 1996 4.33 34.14 30.09 15.76 3.24 
South-Korea, 2001 4.46 33.91 29.69 18.73 4.8 
South-Korea, 2005 4.42 35.48 30.94 21.96 6.51 
Spain, 1990 6.00 35.41 27.54 19.08 19.9 
Spain, 1995 5.49 44.80 34.50 20.49 21.4 
Spain, 1999 5.89 41.81 33.49 23.15 20.2 
Spain, 2007 5.33 37.13 31.24 27.98 21.1 
Sweden, 1999 5.06 48.63 22.10 24.70 32 
Sweden, 2006 4.91 46.74 23.70 32.32 29.1 
Switzerland, 1996 6.18 40.44 29.24 32.01 17.5 
Switzerland, 2007 7.38 46.87 29.93 36.71 20.2 
Turkey, 1996 5.89 43.33 43.78 8.378 5.6 
Turkey, 2007 6.01 44.87 39.75 11.58 9.9 
USA, 1990 4.21 43.00 33.39 31.72 13.6 
USA, 1995 5.52 45.90 35.50 33.41 15.5 
USA, 1999 5.24 46.99 37.09 36.94 14.5 
USA, 2006 4.81 47.25 37.09 41.83 16 
Luxemburg, 1999 4.24 38.69 26.37 53.32 20.9 
Public expenditure is presented as a percentage of the GDP. 
 
Table 8.2:Descriptive statistic, individual-level, unfiltered. 
Variables Mean S.D.  Min. Max.  N 
Support of income 
redistribution 
5.39 2.73 1 10 99185 
Woman 0.52 0.50 0 1 99047 
Unemployed 0.44 0.50 0 1 95157 
Union member 0.18 0.38 0 1 96438 
Religious attendance 3.91 2.53 1 8 96840 
Household income 4.95 2.58 1 10 84501 
Age 44.05 16.96 15 98 98916 
Descriptive statistics for everyone who has answered the dependent variable and one of the other variables. In 
the actual analysis, only those who has data on all variables has been included. 
  
